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ABSTRACT
The belief that malpractice lawsuits impede efforts to improve health care quality by 
encouraging providers to hide mistakes is the conventional wisdom among patient safety 
advocates and scholars.  It also provides the normative basis for efforts currently 
proceeding at the state and federal levels to curtail medical malpractice exposure.  Groups 
pressing for tort reform, including the American Medical Association, contend that when 
doctors and other providers are insulated from liability, patients will be better protected 
from harm. 
This article canvasses the evidence bearing on the connection between malpractice 
exposure and health care quality.  Some of this evidence, such as the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study, shows that the quality of health care improves as the risk of being sued 
rises; none of it shows that malpractice lawsuits cause the quality of health care to 
decline.  The widely held belief that fear of malpractice liability impedes efforts to 
improve the reliability of health care delivery systems is unfounded.
The central causes of the high error rates that persist in the health care sector appear to be 
providers’ defective incentives and professional norms.  Providers lose money when 
quality improves, and their norms discourage the creation of non-punitive working 
environments in which efforts to improve quality can flourish.  The “business case for 
quality” is missing, and providers attitudes are antithetical to quality improvement.  The 
tort system’s major deficiency is its failure to subject providers to sufficient economic 
pressure to overcome these impediments.  The cause of this shortcoming is the rarity with 
which injured patients assert legal claims.  
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I. Introduction 
Malpractice liability is the scourge of modern medicine.  
Physicians defeated polio, smallpox, whooping cough, measles, and 
managed care, but the tort system continues to stymie them.  Malpractice 
premiums in some specialties now exceed $200,000 per year.  Premium 
spikes in excess of 100% have been reported for physicians who have 
never been sued.  Demoralized doctors are said to be “going bare,” 
relocating, retiring, excluding risky services from their practices, and 
hiding their assets.  They are also organizing strikes, protests, and “sick-
outs,” and pressing for state and federal malpractice reforms.  The 
American Medical Association (AMA) has declared a malpractice “crisis” 
in nineteen states, claiming that important health care services are in short 
supply.3
Liability insurance costs created the first malpractice “crisis” of the 
twenty-first century, but health care providers have other complaints about 
the tort system as well.  They accuse patients of running to plaintiffs’ 
lawyers whenever bad outcomes occur, even when providers perform 
flawlessly.  They accuse greedy trial lawyers of filing frivolous cases to 
extort settlements from insurance companies that care more about defense 
costs than physicians’ reputations.  They criticize the trial process, 
claiming that lawsuits last too long, that plaintiffs’ attorneys use emotional 
appeals to mislead know-nothing jurors into awarding multi-million dollar 
verdicts, and that injured patients wind up with too little compensation 
after paying their lawyers’ eye-popping contingent fees.  
For years, health care providers even denied the existence of 
substandard care.  “[T]he profession’s longstanding argument against tort 
liability had been that medical errors are few, with litigation resulting 
mainly from rabble-rousing by unscrupulous lawyers and expert 
3 See American Medical Association, 19 States Now in Full Blown Medical Liability 
Crisis, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/6282-7347.html (visited October 31, 
2003).  See also Michelle Mello, David A. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, The New 
Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348 New Eng. J. Med. 2281 (2003).  Recent reports by the 
General Accounting Office found that premiums have increased for a variety of reasons, 
and that many claims of diminished access were false, exaggerated, or the results of 
actions not linked to malpractice liability.  See General Accounting Office, Medical 
Malpractice: Implications of Rising Premiums on Access to Health Care (August, 2003) 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf (visited October 30, 2003); General 
Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice Insurance: Multiple Factors Have Contributed 
to Increased Premium Rates (June 2003) http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03702.pdf
(visited October 30, 2003).
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witnesses.”4  The AMA finally conceded “that medical mistakes happen—
are even common” in 1996, after empirical researchers generated evidence 
that could be neither refuted nor dismissed.5
Providers did not abandon their attack on tort liability when the 
high social cost of medical errors was proved.  They changed their tune.  
Instead of denying that errors occur, providers now assert that tort liability 
prevents them from improving health care delivery systems by driving 
error reports underground.  A typical example of this view appears in the 
Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) 1999 report “To Err Is Human”: “patient 
safety is hindered through the liability system and the threat of malpractice 
which discourage the disclosure of errors.  The discoverability of data 
under legal proceedings encourages silence about errors committed or 
observed.”6  This claim has become the conventional wisdom among 
public health researchers, doctors, organized medicine, tort reform 
advocates, and legal scholars.  Writings on patient safety routinely identify 
malpractice reform as a critical component of any attempt to improve the 
quality of health care.  The tort system is always part of the problem –
never part of the solution.  
The charge that liability impedes quality improvement is 
interesting for a number of reasons.  First, it implicitly admits that health 
care providers behave in a self-interested fashion.  Punishments 
discourage providers from reporting errors because providers do not want 
to be punished.  The concession is important because health care 
professionals typically deny that self-interest influences their decisions.  
They style themselves as patients’ advocates and invariably claim to put 
patients’ interests ahead of their own.  
Once providers admit to being self-interested – particularly in an 
area involving quality, a core matter of professional competence – the case 
for external oversight of medical professionals strengthens dramatically.  
The traditional justification for professional self-regulation is the shared 
belief that physicians and other providers can be trusted to act for the 
benefit of others.  If that expectation is inaccurate – and the medical 
profession’s position with regard to patient safety is premised on its 
falsehood – then the case for vigorous external regulation becomes 
compelling.  Courts, state medical boards, ethics committees, and other 
administrative bodies should be treating providers much more firmly than 
they do.   
4
 William M. Sage, Understanding the First Malpractice Crisis of the 21st Century, 2003 
Health Law Handbook ** (citing Louis J. Regan, Medicine and the Law, New England 
Journal of Medicine 1954; 250: 463.).
5
 L. O. Prager, Safety-Centered Care, American Medical News 36, No. 26 (May 13, 
1996), p. 1.
6
  Institute of Medicine, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System 43 (1999).
Malpractice Liability and Health Care Quality 5
Second, the assertion that liability impedes progress on the medical 
error front calls into question the broader policy justification of tort law.  
Tort scholars believe that liability encourages producers of goods and 
services to exercise due care by forcing them to internalize the costs of 
their negligence.7  If liability actually discourages vendors from taking due 
care by driving errors underground, this analysis must be reconsidered.  
Perhaps the standard tort model accurately describes the influence of tort 
law in some areas of productive activity but not others.  Perhaps it is 
wrong across the board.  Doctors and nurses are hardly the only tortfeasors 
who can hide problems.8  If punishments are bad because they discourage 
people from admitting, reporting, and correcting deficiencies, a 
comprehensive rollback of tort liability might be in order.  Alternatively, if 
these arguments are insufficient to justify wholesale reconsideration of tort 
law for non-health care defendants, the obvious question is why they 
should be credited in the health care context.  
Third, as shown below, the best available empirical evidence 
indicates that liability for negligence sometimes improves the quality of 
health care by motivating providers to do a better job.  Consequently, the 
charge that negligence liability discourages providers from reporting 
errors, drives them from the profession, and has other negative effects 
identifies a need for a balanced policy judgment but does not show how 
the judgment should be made.  The mix and availability of services with 
liability may be better or worse than the mix and availability of services 
without liability; and the mix and availability of services may vary 
depending on the details of how liability determinations are made and 
implemented.  Because provider quality varies enormously, the possibility 
that malpractice liability generates net benefits by driving substandard 
providers out of the market cannot be dismissed out of hand.  Nor can one 
dismiss the possibility that malpractice liability improves outcomes and 
lowers costs by channeling patients from low-volume providers to high-
volume providers in areas where volume-quality relationships exist.  
Because liability can have both good effects and bad ones, a sophisticated 
policy assessment will weigh both its costs and its benefits, and not its 
costs alone.  
7
 See e.g., Patricia M. Danzon, Liability For Medical Malpractice, in Handbook of 
Health Economics, A.J. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse, eds., 1343-1350 (2000) (discussing 
standard economic analysis of tort law as applied to medical malpractice).
8
 Product manufacturers and drug companies can cover up reports of defects and 
dangerous side effects.  Drivers can lie about their sobriety and their speed.  Cigarette 
companies can misrepresent their knowledge of the dangerousness and addictiveness of 
tobacco products.  
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Fourth, the charge that liability slows progress by squelching error 
reports is persuasive only if liability is an important impediment in its own 
right.   If other forces also drive errors underground, a policy decision to 
eliminate liability might make things worse by extinguishing the positive 
effects of liability without causing more information about errors to 
surface.  Most calls for reform ignore this problem, even though it is well 
known that failures to report errors have multiple causes.  The causes 
include a culture of perfectionism inside the medical profession that 
creates “indelible impressions of fear” by shaming, blaming, and even 
humiliating doctors and nurses who make mistakes;9 fragmented delivery 
systems that require coordination of multiple independent providers;10 the 
prevalence of third party payment systems and administered prices;11
overwork, stress, and burnout;12 information overload;13 doctors’ status as 
independent contractors and their desire for professional independence;14
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act;15 a shortage of 
nurses;16 underinvestment in technology that can reduce errors,17 and so 
9
 For detailed descriptions of the harshness with which physicians treat colleagues who 
make mistakes, see David Hilfiker, Confronting Our Mistakes, in Susan B. Rubin and 
Laurie Zoloth, eds., Margin of Error: The Ethics of Mistakes in the Practice of Medicine 
87, 92 (2000); Bryan A Liang, The Adverse Event of Unaddressed Medical Error: 
Identifying and Filling the Holes in the Health-Care and Legal Systems, 29 J. L., Med. & 
Ethics 346, 348 (2001); Bryan A. Liang, Promoting Patient Safety through Reducing 
Medical Error: A Paradigm of Cooperation between Patient, Physician, and Attorney, 24 
S. Ill. U. L. J. 541, 545 (2000).
10
 IOM, To Err is Human 2-3 (1999).
11
 Id., p. 3; Joseph P. Newhouse, Why Is There a Quality Chasm?, 21 Health Aff. 13 
(2002) (describing problems caused by administered prices).
12
 Darrell A. Campbell Jr. and Patricia L. Cornett, How Stress and Burnout Produce 
Medical Mistakes, in Marilynn M. Rosenthal and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, eds., Medical 
Error: What Do We Know? What Do We Do? 37 (2002); Robert J. Blendon, et al., Views 
of Practicing Physicians and the Public on Medical Errors, 347 New Engl. J. Med. 1933 
(2002) (finding that 50 percent of doctors surveyed identified overwork, stress, and 
fatigue as a very important cause of errors).                      
13
 Joseph P. Newhouse, Why Is There a Quality Chasm?, 21 Health Aff. 13 (2002) 
(describing the rate of increase of medical devices, drugs, procedures, and knowledge, 
and explaining that physicians have great difficulty keeping up).
14
 Liang, supra, at 350.
15
 Id., at 353-357.
16
 Robert J. Blendon, et al., Views of Practicing Physicians and the Public on Medical 
Errors, 347 New Engl. J. Med. 1933 (2002) (finding that 52 percent of doctors surveyed 
identify understaffing of nurses as a very important cause of errors).
17
 David M. Studdert, Troyen A. Brennan, and Eric J. Thomas, What Have We Learned 
Since the Harvard Medical Practice Study?, in Marilynn M. Rosenthal and Kathleen M. 
Sutcliffe, eds., Medical Error: What Do We Know? What Do We Do? 3, 21 (2002) 
(“U.S. hospitals are almost certainly underspending in their efforts to prevent adverse 
events,” including the failure to adopt computerized physician order entry (CPOE) 
systems).  
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on.  Both individually and collectively, these factors have discouraged 
providers from implementing proven safety measures and from developing 
more reliable delivery systems.18  Given the significance of these factors, it 
is naïve to think that error reporting would improve automatically if the 
threat of liability were removed.  
Finally, most of the tort “reforms” put forward by providers, 
professional associations, and lobbying groups would not address the 
alleged tendency of liability exposure to impede error reduction.  The most 
popular proposals (damages caps, credits for payments from collateral 
sources, heightened requirements for expert witnesses, and limits on 
contingent fees) have more to do with provider self-interest than health 
care quality.  Their purpose is to reduce insurance costs in the short run, 
not to improve delivery systems in ways that address low quality care or 
make harmful errors less common.
Fear of liability has little to power to explain the quality problems 
that pervade the health care sector.  Defective incentives are far more 
important.  For a variety of reasons, the health care marketplace 
discourages providers from taking due care.19  Some payment 
arrangements even have the paradoxical effect of making it financially 
advantageous for providers to harm patients.  Because removing the threat 
18
 The Veterans Administration spent $478 million over 3 years “to support its national 
patient safety initiatives.”  GAO, VA Patient Safety: Initiatives Promising but Continued 
Progress Requires Culture Change, GAO/T-HEHS-00-167 8 (2000).  Even after 
spending this mammoth amount, the VA had failed to implement important technologies 
like bar code medication administration at all its hospitals and had just begun to create a 
voluntary error reporting system.  Id. at 5 & 6.  
Computerized decision-support technology was predicted to cost Kaiser 
Permanente $2 billion over three years.  Cathy Tokarski, Medical Error-prevention 
Strategies Face Barriers to Acceptance, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 
www.ahrq.gov/news/medscap2.htm (May 2000).  Dr. Lucian Leape estimates that about 
5 million adverse events and near misses occur each year, and observes that the Aviation 
Safety Reporting System, the model often touted for health care, costs $70 per error 
report to run.  Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, supra, at 1636-1637,
See Institute of Medicine, supra note *, at 12-13 ("A number of practices have 
been shown to reduce errors in the medication process.  Several professional and 
collaborative organizations interested in patient safety have developed and published 
recommendations for safe medication practices, especially for hospitals.  Although some 
of these recommendations have been implemented, none have been universally adopted 
and some are not yet implemented in a majority of hospitals.").  See also Id. at 12 
(recommendation 8.2: health care organizations should "implement proven medication 
safety practices.").
19
 These reasons include the prevalence of third party payment arrangements, patients’ 
ignorance, the difficulty of distinguishing better providers from poorer ones, and time-
lags between investments and improvements in health.  See Part **, infra. 
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of malpractice liability would not fix these problems, thoroughgoing tort 
reform is more likely to harm health care quality than improve it.
We do not contend that the civil justice system creates optimal 
incentives for providers to protect patients from avoidable errors.  It does 
not and, in all likelihood, it never will.  Our point is that unless and until 
changes in compensation arrangements create a “business case for 
quality,” providers will continue to provide low quality care to many 
patients and the health care sector will under-perform the rest of the 
economy.  We also contend that in the absence of direct economic 
incentives for providers to exercise due care, removing liability rights is 
likely to make matters worse, not better, by freeing providers to serve their 
own interests instead of their patients.  
Rather than abolish liability or weaken it to protect the economic 
self-interest of providers, a sensible policy strategy would meld the 
strengths of the liability- and systems-based approaches to patient safety.  
It would ask when and how liability has encouraged providers to develop 
more reliable delivery systems, and propose reforms designed to 
strengthen this effect.  This Article offers some examples showing how 
this strategy might work.
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II documents the need to 
improve delivery systems by summarizing what is known about health 
care quality and medical error.  Part III describes the conventional wisdom 
that medical malpractice liability impedes the improvement of health care 
by discouraging health care providers from reporting mistakes and 
addressing their causes.  Part IV examines the available evidence bearing 
on the connection between tort law and health care quality and argues that 
malpractice exposure more likely improves the quality of health care than 
detracts from it.  In other words, Part IV shows that the conventional 
wisdom is at best unsupported and at worst wrong.  Part V argues that 
quality problems are more likely attributable to professional norms and 
economic incentives than to liability.  Part VI begins the project of 
enhancing the quality-improving force of the tort system by examining the 
obstacles that currently impede it operation.  Part VII suggests some ways 
the problems identified in Part VI could be addressed.  Part VIII offers a 
brief conclusion.   
II. A Primer on Health Care Quality and Medical Error
The medical profession has strong professional norms regarding 
the importance of delivering high-quality error-free care.  These norms are 
inculcated throughout medical school and residency training.  Dr. Atul 
Gawande aptly captures the basic ethos:  
Western medicine is dominated by a single imperative—the 
quest for machinelike perfection in the delivery of care.  
From the first day of medical training, it is clear that errors 
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are unacceptable. . . .  [E]very X ray must be tracked down 
and every drug dose must be exactly right.  No allergy or 
previous medical problems can be forgotten, no diagnosis 
missed.  In the operating room, no movement, no time, no 
drop of blood can be wasted.20
Unfortunately, the actual experience of patients diverges 
dramatically from the stated goal of “machinelike perfection in the 
delivery of care.”  The literature on health care quality is replete with 
statements that look like tabloid headlines: “one-fourth of hospital deaths 
may be preventable;”21 “180,000 people may die” every year “partly as a 
result of iatrogenic injury;”22 “one-third of some hospital procedures may 
expose patients to risk without improving their health;”23 and “medical 
error is the eighth-leading cause of death in the United States.”24  Health 
care providers in the United States routinely omit indicated procedures of 
known value, frequently perform treatments that are unnecessary and 
inefficacious, and employ practice patterns that vary widely and for no 
good reason.   Adverse drug events are distressingly common.25  Tens of 
billions of dollars are spent annually on medical services whose value is 
questionable or non-existent. 26
20
 Atul Gawande, Complications: A Surgeon’s Notes on an Imperfect Science 38 (2002).  
For an excellent review of this book, see Steven Lubet, Like a Surgeon, 88 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1178 (2003).  For other perspectives on the norms inculcated during residency 
training, see Charles Bosk, Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure (1979).
21Robert H. Brook et al., Health System Reform and Quality, 276 JAMA 476 (1996). 
22
 R.W. Dubois & Robert H. Brook, Preventable Deaths: Who, How Often, and Why? 
109 Annals Internal Med. 582 (1988).  
23
 Stephen M. Shortell, Charles L. Bennett, and Gayle R. Byck, Assessing the Impact of 
Continuous Quality Improvement on Clinical Practice: What It Will Take to Accelerate 
Progress, 76 Milbank Quarterly 593, 593 (1998).
24
 Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human (1999).  
25David P. Phillips et al, Increase in U.S. Medication-Error Deaths between 1983 and 
1993, 351 Lancet 255 (1999); David C. Classen et al., Adverse Drug Events in 
Hospitalized Patients: Excess Length of Stay, Extra Costs and Attributable Mortality, 277 
JAMA 301 (1997); David W. Bates et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Events and 
Potential Adverse Drug Events: Implications for Prevention, 274 JAMA 29 (1995).    
26 See Hilfiker, supra, at 90 (“[P]erhaps the most frequent result of physician 
misjudgment is the wasting of money, often in large amounts.”); Milt Freudenheim, 
Study Finds Inefficiency in Health Care, New York Times, June 11, 2002 (reporting 
Juran Institute estimate that “$390 billion per year is being wasted on outmoded and 
inefficient medical procedures”); Midwest Business Group on Health, Reducing the 
Costs of Poor-Quality Health Care Through Responsible Purchasing Leadership i (2nd
printing, Apr. 2003) (updated version of Juran Institute report contending that “$420 
billion spent each year” on poor quality health care); Jonathan Skinner and John E. 
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American health care is also dogged by unacceptably high error 
rates.  In a 1999 report, the IOM concluded that medical errors kill 44,000 
– 98,000 Americans and injure hundreds of thousands more every year.27
These errors result in staggering social costs –most of which are borne by 
victims and their families.  Serious quality problems afflict every aspect of 
the American health care system, irrespective of insurance coverage and 
delivery arrangements.  Simply stated, “quality problems … abound in 
American medicine.  The majority of these problems are not rare, 
unpredictable, or inevitable concomitants of the delivery of complex, 
modern health care.  Rather, they are frighteningly common, often 
predictable, and frequently preventable.”28
Consider hernia repair.  This (relatively simple) surgical procedure, 
which is one of the “bread and butter” procedures of a general surgery 
practice, is performed tens of thousands of times every year in the United 
States.  Most general surgeons perform several hundred of these 
procedures during the course of their careers.  The procedure takes 
approximately ninety minutes, costs several thousand dollars, and fails 
approximately 10-15% of the time.  Yet, at a small medical center in 
Toronto, hernia repair takes less than half as long, costs half as much, and 
has a recurrence rate of only 1%.  
The reasons for this extraordinary performance are simple; 
physicians at the Toronto clinic “do hernia operations and nothing else.  
Each surgeon repairs between six hundred and eight hundred hernias a 
year—more than most general surgeons do in a lifetime.”29  Surgery at the 
clinic is performed according to a standardized protocol by a specialized 
team of experienced personnel.  The result is that these surgeons out-
Wennberg, How Much Is Enough? Efficiency and Medicare Spending In The Last Six 
Months Of Life, NBER Working Paper 6513 (1998) (finding “no evidence of any 
improved outcome (as measured by survival) associated with increased levels of 
spending” on elderly Medicare patients in Miami versus lower levels of spending in 
Minneapolis).
27
 IOM, To Err, supra note **, at 1.  These figures have been somewhat controversial.  
Researchers have argued that many of the patients would have died anyway, or that 
reviewer assessments are unreliable.  See Rodney A. Hayward & Timothy P. Hofer, 
Estimating Hospital Deaths Due to Medical Errors: Preventability is in the Eye of the 
Reviewer, 286 JAMA 415 (2001); Christopher M. Hughes, et al., Deaths Due to Medical 
Errors are Exaggerated in Institute if Medicine Report, 284 JAMA 93 (2000).  Those 
involved in the preparation of the Institute of Medicine report have defended these 
figures.  See Lucian Leape, Institute of Medicine medical error figures are not 
exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95 (2000).  But see Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of 
Medicine Report on Medical Errors: Can It Do Harm?, 342 New Eng. J. Med. 1123 
(2000).
28
 Mark R. Chassin, Is Health Care Ready for Six Sigma Quality? 76 Milbank Quarterly 
565, 566 (1998)
29
 Gawande, supra note ** at 38.
Malpractice Liability and Health Care Quality 11
perform all other providers of hernia repair in North America, even though 
several have not completed a general surgery residency and the surgeon-
in-chief is an obstetrician.  This extraordinary performance demonstrates 
the potential benefits of an undeviating focus on excellence in the 
provision of a discrete service or treatment (a “focused factory”).30  These 
results also point to a phenomenon that has been observed in numerous 
areas of the economy, including health care: the positive relationship 
between the volume of services provided and the quality of those services 
(volume- quality relationship).  
Volume-quality relationships have been documented for a wide 
range of medical procedures.31  Consider coronary artery bypass grafting 
(CABG), a surgical treatment that approximately 600,000 Americans 
receive every year.32   Researchers have long known that high volume 
surgeons and hospitals produce significantly better results for CABG 
patients than low volume providers.  The risk of in-hospital mortality can 
vary by a factor of four.33  Yet low volume providers continue to perform 
large numbers of CABG procedures, exposing many patients to excessive 
30 See generally Regina Herzlinger, Market-Driven Health Care
31
 See Harold S. Luft et al., Hospital Volume, Physician Volume and Patient Outcomes: 
Assessing the Evidence 103 fig. 5.1 (Health Admin. Press Perspectives 1990) [hereinafter 
Assessing the Evidence]; Edward L. Hannan et al., A Longitudinal Analysis of the 
Relationship between In-Hospital Mortality in New York State and the Volume of 
Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm Surgeries Performed, 27 Health Serv. Res. 517, 535-36 
(1992); Herbert R. Karp et al., Carotid Endarterectomy Among Medicare Beneficiaries: 
A Statewide Evaluation of Appropriateness and Outcome, 29 Stroke 46, 48 (1998) 
(finding that "[t]he mortality and stroke rates [following carotid endarterectomies at] 
hospitals with a history of [10 or fewer surgeries] per year was 2.6-fold higher than that 
at hospitals performing [50 or more]"); Samuel O. Thier & Annetine C. Gelijns, 
Improving Health: The Reason Performance Measurement Matters, 17 Health Aff. 26, 
26-27 (1998). 
32
 See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., The Challenge and Potential for Assuring 
Quality Health Care for the 21st Century, (June 17, 1998), available at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/21stcena.htm (presenting statistics on CABG utilization) 
[hereinafter HHS, The Challenge].
33
 Michael L. Millenson, Demanding Medical Excellence 192 (U. Chi. Press 1997) 
(noting quadrupling of risk); Kevin Grumbach et al., Regionalization of Cardiac Surgery 
in the United States and Canada, 274 JAMA 1282 (1995) (reporting death rates 
following cardiac bypass surgery were twice as high at California hospitals performing 
fewer than 100 procedures per year than at hospitals performing 500 or more); Edward L. 
Hannan, The Relation Between Volume and Outcome in Health Care, 340 New Eng. J. 
Med. 1677, 1678 (1999) (noting that, in one study of 1989 data, "the risk-adjusted 
mortality rate for patients of surgeons who performed fewer than 50 [bypass operations] 
(7.94%) was more than twice the mortality rate for patients of surgeons who performed 
150 or more procedures (3.57%)").
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risks, and killing an appreciable number of them.34  The problem is not 
limited to CABG.  A study of patients treated in California in 1997 
estimated that more than 600 deaths occurred because patients visited low 
volume hospitals for a number of procedures for which volume-quality 
relationships had been established, instead of hospitals that performed 
these procedures in larger numbers.35
To be sure, quality problems are far broader and more pervasive 
than these examples of volume-quality relationships might suggest.  As a 
1998 literature review summarized matters, the
dominant finding … is that there are large gaps between the 
care people should receive and the care they do receive.  
This is true for all three types of care—preventive, acute, 
and chronic—whether one goes for a check-up, a sore 
throat, or diabetic care.  It is true whether one looks at 
overuse or underuse.  It is true in different types of health 
care facilities and for different types of health insurance.  It 
is true for all age groups, from children to the elderly.  And 
it is true whether one is looking at the whole country or a 
single city. . . A simple average of the findings of the 
preventive care studies shows that about 50 percent of 
people received recommended care.  An average of 70 
percent … received recommended acute care, and 30 
percent received contraindicated acute care.  For chronic 
conditions, 60 percent received recommended care and 20 
percent received contraindicated care.36
The quality problems with American medicine include every conceivable 
example of overuse, underuse, misuse, and out-and-out error.  Among 
hospitalized patients, these problems result in an “epidemic of potentially 
preventable iatrogenic death.”37  The Institute of Medicine estimates that 
34
 See Michael L. Millenson, Demanding Medical Excellence 187 (U. Chi. Press 1997).  
See also Kelly Devers & Gigi Y. Liu, Leapfrog Patient-Safety Standards are a Stretch for 
Most Hospitals, Center for Studying Health System Change, Issue Brief No. 77 (Feb. 
2004) (reporting that “only 35.7 percent of hospitals [surveyed] met the Leapfrog 
[volume] threshold for coronary artery bypass graft surgery”). 
35 R. Adams Dudley et al., Selective Referral to High-Volume Hospitals: Estimating 
Potentially Avoidable Deaths, 283 JAMA 1159, 1163 (2000).  
36
 Mark A. Schuster, Elizabeth A. McGlynn, and Robert H. Brook, How Good Is the 
Quality of Health Care in the United States? 76 Milbank Quarterly 517, 520-21 (1998).  
See also Juliette Cubanski and Janet Kline, Improving Health Care Quality: Can Federal 
Efforts Lead the Way?, The Commonweath Fund Issue Brief #539 1 (April 2002).
37
 The Leapfrog Group contends that “over 160,000 deaths that occur [annually] in the 
ICU [intensive care unit] could be avoided” if all urban hospitals implemented its ICU 
Physician Staffing Guideline.  The Leapfrog Group, Fact Sheet: ICU Physician Staffing 1 
(9/02/03).  Studdert et al., supra, at 13.  Robert J. Blendon et al., Views of Practicing 
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medical error is the eighth leading cause of death in the United States, 
ranking ahead of AIDS, motor vehicle accidents, and breast cancer.  
Preventable nosocomial infections are so common that the Centers for 
Disease Control estimated that strict adherence to hand-washing 
procedures alone would save 20,000 lives every year.38  Non-mortal 
injuries occur even more often.39  “[O]ver a million people are injured by 
medical treatments annually in the U.S.”40
Mistakes that occur during hospitalizations are only part of the 
picture.  Additional errors occur during home care, primary care, 
ambulatory care, and nursing home care.  The frequency of errors in 
outpatient settings has not been studied as thoroughly,41 but the available 
evidence suggests that outpatient care is subject to many of the same 
quality problems that afflict inpatient care.42
Treatment variations are enormous as well, with patients in some 
areas receiving far higher and far more expensive levels of care than 
others of similar age and physical condition who live elsewhere—with no 
effect on outcomes.  The result is that “geography is destiny” as far as the 
medical treatment one receives is concerned.  One group of commentators 
estimated that Medicare could buy every Florida beneficiary who agreed 
Physicians and the Public on Medical Errors, 347 N. Engl. J. Med. 1933 (2002) (finding 
that “42% of the public and more than one-third of U.S. doctors say they or their family 
members have experienced medical errors in the course of receiving medical care, with 
significant percentages reporting serious consequences.”).
38 See Centers for Disease Control, Healthy Hands USA,
http://www.healthyhandsusa.com/cdc/ (visited October 20, 2003) (“More than two 
million Americans contract an infection during hospital stays.  Of that group, an 
estimated 90,000 die every year from these infections.  Up to 20,000 of these deaths 
could be prevented by practicing simple hand hygiene procedures, such as those outlined 
in the new CDC hand hygiene guideline.”); Michael C. Berens, Infection Epidemic 
Carves Deadly Path, Chi. Trib., July 21, 2002, at 1; Atul Gawande, Hand-washing, New 
Eng. J. Med. (2004).
39
 Although negligence-induced adverse events occur in only about 1 percent of 
hospitalizations, the mortality and morbidity figures are enormous because there are more 
than 30 million episodes of hospitalization each year.  Id. at 20 (reporting 33 million 
hospital discharges in 1992).
40
 Lucien L. Leape, Forward: Preventing Medical Accidents: Is “Systems Analysis” The 
Answer?, 27 Am. J. L. & Med. 145, 146 (2001).
41
 See Elizabeth M. Lapetina and Elizabeth M. Armstrong, Preventing Errors In The 
Outpatient Setting: A Tale of Three States, 21 Health Aff. 26, 26 (2002) (“little if any 
research has focused on errors or adverse events occurring outside of hospital settings”).
42
 See Elizabeth A. McGlynn, et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in 
the United States, 348 N. Engl. J. Med. 2635 (2003) (studying treatments for twenty-five 
conditions, including treatments delivered in ambulatory settings, and finding significant 
quality problems).  
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to receive Minnesota-style health care a fully loaded Lexus and still come 
out ahead.43  The same commentators did a series of studies demonstrating 
that patients in high-care, high-cost areas often fare less well than those 
who receive less care and consume fewer resources.44
Most of the time, these problems occur not because of isolated 
“bad doctors” or because the necessary information is hard to obtain.45
Instead, as one commentator cuttingly noted, “from ulcers to urinary tract 
infections, tonsils to organ transplants, back pain to breast cancer, asthma 
to arteriosclerosis, the evidence is irrefutable.  Tens of thousands of 
patients have died or been injured year after year because readily 
available information was not used — and is not being used today — to 
guide their care.”46
A final problem is the lack of information regarding the absolute 
efficacy (let alone the cost-effectiveness) of many diagnostic tests and 
medical treatments.47  Manufacturers must provide evidence of 
effectiveness to gain regulatory approval for new pharmaceuticals, but no 
such requirement applies to medical procedures.  Consequently, doctors 
can administer treatments that have never been proven to work – and once 
these treatments are introduced, they can rapidly become the standard of 
care.48  For example, about 300,000 Americans receive arthroscopic knee 
43 See John E. Wennberg, Elliott S. Fisher & Jonathan S. Skinner, Geography and the 
Debate Over Medicare Reform, Health Aff. Web Exclusive (Feb. 16, 2002) 
(demonstrating substantial regional variation in Medicare expenditures and treatment 
patterns, without discernable positive effect on outcome or health status), at 
http://www.pnhp.org/news/2002/february/geography_and_the_de.php (last visited Sept. 
30, 2003).
44 See Elliot Fisher and David Wennberg, The Implications of Regional Variation in 
Medicare Spending, Part 1: The Content, Quality, and Accessibility of Care, Annals of 
Internal Medicine 276 (2003); Elliot Fisher and David Wennberg, The Implications of 
Regional Variation in Medicare Spending, Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction 
with Care, Annals Intern. Med. 293 (2003).  
45
 Obviously, this generalization has important exceptions.  Some bad doctors exist, and 
information about best practices is sometimes hard to obtain.
46
 Michael L. Millenson, Demanding Medical Excellence: Doctors and Accountability in 
the Information Age 353 (1997) (emphasis supplied).  The AMA recognizes the 
persistence of errors as a problem.  See AMA, A Culture of Safety, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/article/3216-6570.html (“According to a recent study from the national 
standards-setting organization U.S. Pharmacopeia, while U.S. hospitals and health care 
systems have improved their track record of reporting medication errors, they continue to 
make the same mistakes over and over. ”)  
47
 Robert J. Marder, Relationship of Clinical Indicators and Practice Guidelines, 16 
Quality Review Bulletin 2: 60, 60 (1990) (discussing lack of evidence showing 
effectiveness of many treatments and opining that “[m]uch of the inappropriate use of 
technology results from medical uncertainty”).
48
 Jensen & Tinker, supra, at 15-16 (“The truth is that many currently ‘standard’ 
diagnostic and therapeutic practices, involving huge numbers of patients, high risks, and 
tremendous costs, rest upon very uncertain foundations with respect to efficacy.”)
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surgery for osteoarthritis annually, at an estimated cost of $1.5 billion per 
year.  Yet, a study published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 
2002 found that patients who received the surgery handled tasks like 
walking and climbing stairs less well than patients who did not.49  Other 
common procedures, such as coronary artery bypass surgery and spinal 
fusion surgery, also fail to help many patients who receive them.50  In one 
recent high-profile example (bone marrow transplant for advanced breast 
cancer), the treatment provided no benefits, and killed an appreciable 
number of the women who received it.51
Although hospitals and physicians profess a commitment to 
providing high quality care, reality lags far behind rhetoric.  There are a 
number of reasons why quality is so variable, including the decentralized 
and fragmented nature of the health care delivery system, the dominance 
of third party payers who have historically cared more about costs than 
quality, the tradition of deference to the medical profession to handle 
issues of quality, the lack of visibility of the issue for consumers and 
politicians, the process through which providers are trained and socialized, 
the presence of multiple agency relationships, and the lack of competitive 
alternatives to existing coverage and delivery arrangements.  The 
immediate question, given all these market imperfections, is whether 
medical liability makes matters worse by impeding desirable reforms or 
exerts pressure to improve by creating incentives to address quality 
problems.  Part III turns to these issues.  
III. The Conventional Wisdom: Liability Exposure Impedes 
Quality Improvement by Discouraging Error Reporting 
As noted previously, the conventional wisdom within the health 
care sector is that malpractice liability makes it more difficult to address 
problems with patient safety and health care quality by restricting the free 
49
 J. Bruce Moseley et al., A Controlled Trial of Arthroscopic Surgery for Osteoarthritis 
of the Knee, 347 New Engl. J. Med. 81 (July 11, 2002).  See also Linda A. Johnson, Study 
Finds Common Knee Surgery Doesn’t Work, Associated Press (July 10, 2002).  
50
 Jensen & Tinker, supra, at 19-20; Richard A. Deyo et al., Spinal-Fusion Surgery—The 
Case for Restraint, New Engl. J. Med. 350:7 (Feb. 12, 2004); Abigail Zuger, New Way of 
Doctoring: By the Book, New York Times, Dec. 16, 1997 (reporting on study finding 
that, although elderly heart attack patients in the U.S. received coronary angioplasty and 
bypass surgery almost eight times as often as Canadian patients, survival rates a year 
after the heart attack were about the same for both groups).
51 See Michelle Mello & Troyen Brennan, The Controversy Over High-Dose 
Chemotherapy With Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant for Breast Cancer, 20 Health 
Affairs 101 (2001).  
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flow of information on the subject.52  This criticism is an article of faith 
among health policy experts, and it also finds a ready reception among 
those who view trial lawyers and the tort system with skepticism or 
disdain.53
The conventional wisdom achieved its greatest political saliency in 
1999 when the IOM flatly asserted that “liability concerns discourage the 
surfacing of errors and communication about how to correct them,” and 
that “patient safety is [] hindered through the liability system and the 
threat of malpractice, which discourages the disclosure of errors.”54  The 
IOM repeated the charge in 2001, suggesting that, “alternative approaches 
to liability, such as enterprise liability or no-fault compensation, could 
produce a legal environment more conducive to uncovering and resolving 
quality problems.”55
Provider organizations have used these conclusions to advance 
their political agenda of curtailing medical malpractice liability.  The 
AMA claims to oppose tort regulation because it wants to “creat[e] a 
climate where reporting of errors will occur so that the information can be 
used to improve the [health care] system and avoid repeating in the 
future.”56  The AMA also asserts that “for error reporting systems to be 
successful, they must be constructed in a non-punitive manner that 
52
 See fn. 6 and accompanying text.  See also William B. Runciman and Fiona Tito, 
Error, Blame, and the Law in Health Care—An Antipodean Perspective, Annals of 
Internal Medicine 138:12, 974, 978 (2003) (“Blaming and punishing for the inevitable 
errors that will be made by well-intentioned people working in health care drives the 
problem of iatrogenic harm underground and alienates those who are best placed to 
prevent such problems from recurring.”).
53 See, e.g., Newt Gingrich, Saving Lives & Saving Money: Transforming Health and 
Healthcare 125 (2003) (stating that “patient safety is often weakened by possible litigious 
implications” of information sharing, citing and quoting To Err is Human); Our Common 
Good, http://cgood.org/medicine/item?item_id=3396 (reporting survey results that 
“nearly half of all nurses feel prohibited or discouraged from doing what they think is 
right for the patient in the way of disclosing and discussing errors because of rules or 
protocols set up for liability protection,” and that although doctors recognize that frank 
discussions of adverse events with colleagues can help them improve the quality of the 
services they deliver, fear of liability discourages them from talking about errors and 
thinking of ways to reduce them.); A.M.A., Medical Liability Reform Now! 23 (arguing 
that compared with disciplining physicians, “a better approach to the problem of system 
errors would be to dispel the fear by physicians, hospitals, and nurses that open 
discussion o[f] adverse events would be discoverable in lawsuits”).
54
 IOM, supra * at 37.  See also id. at 19 (“Liability concerns discourage the surfacing of 
errors and communication about how to correct them.”).  
55
 See IOM, Crossing the Quality Chasm 219 (2001)
56AMA, Medical Liability Reform: Top 12 Facts and Myths, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/378/falsehoodsjune2003.doc (visited October 26, 2003).
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provide[s] appropriate confidentiality protections.”57  The AMA’s official 
position is that liability has no proper role to play in the regulation of 
health care professionals.
Front-line health care providers are quite outspoken in advancing 
the conventional wisdom.  Beverly Jones, Vice President and Chief 
Nursing Officer at the Henry Ford Health System and a former Associate 
Dean at the University of Michigan School of Nursing, bluntly described 
“[t]he threat of medical malpractice litigation [as] one of the most obvious 
barriers to the improvement of safety. . . .  [D]isclosing one’s own error or 
a colleague’s error poses the risk of financial ruin and loss of professional 
credibility.  These risks also serve as disincentives to participate in 
improvement strategies to reduce the risk of error.”58  Similarly, Dr. Atul 
Gawande asserted “[t]he deeper problem with medical malpractice suits is 
that by demonizing errors they prevent doctors from acknowledging and 
discussing them publicly.”59  These comments represent the views of most 
medical professionals.  As Professor William Sage observed, 
The medical profession by and large heard a single 
message from the IOM[‘s report, To Err Is Human]: that 
exposed, “punitive” approaches to error detection and 
correction are inferior to confidential, cooperative efforts 
from within an expert community.  Because physicians 
regard malpractice litigation as the epitome of punitive, 
they viewed the 1999 IOM report as further evidence that 
liability should be curtailed.  Reasoning that physicians’ 
fear of lawsuits prevented them from owning up to 
mistakes and working to improve quality, they ignored the 
historical irony that the profession’s longstanding argument 
against tort liability had been that medical errors are few, 
with litigation resulting mainly from rabble-rousing by 
unscrupulous lawyers and expert witnesses.  Even [when] 
confronted with irrefutable evidence that errors are 
widespread, physicians remain convinced that malpractice 
liability has no legitimate role to play in quality 
57
 AMA, A Culture of Safety, www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/3216-6570.html
(visited Aug. 29, 2003).
58
 Beverly Jones, Nurses and the “Code of Silence,” in Marilynn M. Rosenthal and 
Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, eds., Medical Error: What Do We Know? What Do We Do? 84, 
91-92 (2002).
59
 Gawande, supra note *, at 37.
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improvement.60
Among academic commentators, agreement is nearly universal that 
incident reporting and quality of care will increase only when malpractice 
liability is curtailed.61  Professor Brian Liang argues that “current tort law 
[] provides strong disincentives to engage in medical error reduction and 
patient safety” because doctors who report errors may suffer financially.62
Professor Larry Gostin agrees and asserts that only a public health 
approach to malpractice can solve these problems.63  Professor Max 
Mehlman contends that “to deter poor quality care you have to identify it 
when it occurs, but the threat of punishment prevents doctors from 
admitting mistakes, and prevents patients from finding out they have been 
victims of malpractice, which prevents the system from figuring out how 
to do things better.”64
Professor Troyen Brennan and his various co-authors (who are 
responsible for the most comprehensive studies of medical malpractice) 
adhere to the conventional wisdom as well.  They assert that malpractice 
liability “may well stifle efforts to reduce error” because practitioners are 
wary “of reporting events that may leave them open to accusations of 
negligence.”65  “[T]he specter of litigation currently stands as a major 
barrier to the free flow of information about medical errors.  Thus, 
removing it would align the foci of the compensation and quality 
60
 William M. Sage, supra note   , at   .
61
 See, e.g., J.M. Healy et al., Confidentiality of Health Care Provider Quality of Care 
Information, 40 Brandeis L. J. 595 (2002); D. H. Johnson & D. W. Shapiro, The Institute 
of Medicine Report on Reducing Medical Error and its Implications for Healthcare 
Providers and Attorneys, 12 Health Lawyer 1 (June 2000).  Although these points are 
usually stated definitively, as shown by statements quoted in the text, some commentators 
have offered more qualified claims.  See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, The Legal Liability 
Regime: How Well Is It Doing In Assuring Quality, Accounting For Costs, and Coping 
With an Evolving Reality In The Health Care Marketplace?, 11 Annals of Health Law 
125, 141 (2002) (observing that “current [malpractice] doctrine may well be standing in 
the way of (instead of advancing) improvements in quality care, precisely the opposite of 
the objective of the traditional tort system.”).  
62
 Brian Liang, The Adverse Event of Unaddressed Medical Error, ** J. L. Med. & Ethics 
351.  See also Brian Liang, Errors in Medicine: Legal Impediments to Reform, 39 
(“[P]hysicians with tort liability concerns may be hesitant to report adverse events and 
medical errors for fear that plaintiffs’ attorneys will have access to this information, thus 
exposing physicians to liability.”).
63
 Larry Gostin, A Public Health Approach to Reducing Error: Medical Malpractice as a 
Barrier, 283 JAMA 1742 (2000).  
64 Case law professor says medical malpractice crisis is the result of an unfair system
http://www.cwru.edu/pubaff/univcomm/2003/8-03/mehlman.htm (visited October 30, 
2003).  
65
 David M. Studdert and Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model of “No-Fault” 
Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 Am. J. L. & Med. 223, 227-228 
(2001).
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improvement systems and center them on precisely those injuries that are 
eradicable.”66  “[T]he moral blame and resulting secrecy of the tort system 
are the antitheses of modern quality improvement.  Moving to a system 
that does not penalize clinicians for reporting adverse events would result 
in increased reporting and thus increased institutional learning about how 
to avoid errors in the future.”67  In short, “to address the problem of 
iatrogenic injuries seriously, we must reform the system of malpractice 
litigation.”68
The best evidence of acceptance of the conventional wisdom may 
be the dearth of commentary disputing it.  Even the authors of this article 
once observed that “because malpractice liability and regulatory sanctions 
rely on ‘shame and blame’ strategies, they can be counter-productive in 
that they drive underground those with the information required to 
enhance quality.”69  Professors Timothy Jost and William Sage stand 
almost alone in being consistently skeptical.  Jost writes that “advocates 
[of the conventional wisdom] do not convincingly explain why health care 
institutions and professionals will undertake the hard work of looking for 
and fixing quality of care problems if they no longer have to worry about 
blame and shame.”70  Sage observes that “tort reform is not an intuitive 
solution to rampant medical error” and that it is unclear why “the medical 
profession, which historically criticized lawyers for inventing medical 
errors where none existed, [should] receive even greater protection from 
lawyers now that we know errors to be widespread.”71
The view that liability impedes quality improvements by 
discouraging error reporting has so many supporters that the decision to 
66
 Studdert et al., supra, at 28.  In Toward a Workable Model, supra, at 228, Studdert and 
Brennan write, “[b]oth anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest that providers are less 
willing to disclose information about errors they make or see when a punitive atmosphere 
prevails.”  
67
 Mello & Brennan, supra, at 1629.
68
 Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors: Could It Do 
Harm?, 342 New Eng. J. Med. 1123-1125 (2000).  See also David M. Studdert, Troyen 
A. Brennan, and Eric J. Thomas, What Have We Learned Since the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study?, in Marilynn M. Rosenthal and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, eds., Medical 
Error: What Do We Know? What Do We Do? 3, 7 (2002)  (“commentators and 
researchers involved in the study of error—many of them clinicians—typically view the 
law’s role with disdain.”).
69
 Hyman & Silver, ** at **, note **.  
70
 T. S. Jost, Legal Issues in Quality of Care Oversight in the United States: Recent 
Developments, 10 European J. Health L. 11, 19 (2003).
71
 William M. Sage, Medical Liability and Patient Safety, 22 Health Affairs 26, 30 
(2003).  Professor Steven Lubet has also derided the tendency of health care providers to 
blame malpractice lawyers for quality problems.  Lubet, supra note   , at   .
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label it the conventional wisdom is apt.  Most commentators support the 
view without qualification.  But is the conventional wisdom true?  Part IV 
analyzes the evidence bearing on the connection between tort liability and 
health care quality to see how closely the conventional wisdom matches 
up with existing knowledge.  
IV. What Do We Know about Medical Liability and Patient 
Safety? 
A. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM HAS NEVER BEEN 
PROVED
Although the conventional wisdom is routinely invoked, it is rarely 
accompanied by citations to supporting empirical research.  For example, 
in To Err Is Human, the IOM offered no empirical support for its assertion 
that “patient safety is [] hindered through the liability system and the 
threat of malpractice, which discourages the disclosure of errors.”72  In 
context, the omission is glaring.  The IOM report supports the many 
statements it contains about the frequency and consequences of medical 
errors with extensive citations to studies.73  Evidently, its authors thought 
their criticism of negligence liability was too obvious to require support.  
Many other writings share this deficiency, asserting that liability impedes 
the improvement of health care safety without citing authority showing 
that malpractice exposure has a statistically significant effect.
The dearth of citations is readily explained.  No statistical study 
shows an inverse correlation between malpractice exposure and the 
frequency of error reporting.  Dr. Lucien L. Leape, a strong proponent of 
error reporting and a leading advocate for patient safety, recently made 
this point in the New England Journal of Medicine, writing that “[t]he fear 
of litigation may [] be overblown.  No link between [error] reporting and 
litigation has ever been demonstrated.”74  Nor does empirical research 
show an inverse correlation between the severity of malpractice exposure 
and medical error rates–which is what the conventional wisdom would 
predict.  
Absent any rigorous empirical foundation, the primary basis for the 
conventional wisdom is its plausibility.  Providers say the fear of liability 
harms the quality of health care because it motivates them to hide 
mistakes, and the current legal framework does attach penalties to some 
errors.  However, plausibility is one thing and truth is another.  To see this, 
72
 IOM, supra * at 37.  See also id. at 19 (“Liability concerns discourage the surfacing of 
errors and communication about how to correct them.”).  
73
 For example, when asserting that “[h]ealth care is not as safe as it should be,” the IOM 
report cites “[a] substantial body of evidence point[ing] to medical errors as a leading 
cause of death and injury.”  IOM, p. 22.
74
 Leape, Reporting of Adverse Events, 347 N. Engl. J. Med. 1633, 1635 (2003).
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consider traffic safety, another context where liability rules apply.  When 
drivers face tort liability, their autonomy is restrained.  When they do not, 
drivers can act upon their independent judgments more freely.  Applied in 
this context, the conventional wisdom suggests that relaxing tort laws 
would improve traffic safety.  The accuracy of this prediction is not self-
evident.  If tort laws were eliminated, many drivers might choose to drive 
dangerously, e.g., by driving exceedingly fast, by driving when 
intoxicated, etc., causing safety to decline.  Whether tort liability makes 
our highways safer or more dangerous is an empirical matter that cannot 
be resolved by speculation.
The same is true of the connection between tort liability and health 
care quality.  Providers may blame the legal system for undesirable 
behaviors (i.e., failures to report errors and address shortcomings), but 
these behaviors may occur for other reasons.  Providers may also fail to 
give credit where it is due.  By penalizing mistakes, the liability system 
may reduce their frequency.  The view that punishments discourage 
unwanted behaviors is plausible too, after all.  Finally, there is a plausible 
middle ground as well.  Liability rules may encourage providers to take 
greater care and discourage them from reporting mistakes.  The question 
then becomes whether the effect on patient safety is positive or negative 
overall.
At the highest level, the critical empirical question is deterrence: 
Does liability for negligence have sufficient deterrent effect to justify the 
associated transaction costs and dislocations, including but not limited to 
those that are part of the conventional wisdom?  The Harvard Medical 
Practice Study (HMPS) studied this issue extensively.75  The results are 
decidedly mixed, but they offer no support for those who argue that 
malpractice impedes efforts to protect patients.  
The HMPS found an inverse relationship between the magnitude
of the malpractice risk and the rate of negligent injuries, meaning that as 
the size of the malpractice risk increased, both the frequency of mistakes 
and the frequency of negligence declined.76  Although the finding was not 
75
 Interestingly, the Harvard team dismissed the corrective justice goals of the tort system 
in their original work, although the subject has reappeared in recent scholarship by the 
team.  Compare Mello & Brennan, supra note **, at 54-55 with Measure of Malpractice, 
supra note **, at 78 (“the value of individualistic corrective justice as a guiding norm for 
medical liability is no longer very relevant in a world in which the burden of liability is 
distributed to the broader community through the interplay of malpractice insurance and 
health care insurance.”)  
76
 Michelle Mello and Troyen A. Brennan, at 1610 (quoting Paul C. Weiler et al., A 
Measure of Malpractice, supra, at 129) (“the malpractice risk variable was negatively 
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statistically significant, the HMPS investigators nonetheless concluded 
that “the litigation system seems to protect many patients from being 
injured in the first place. . . Since prevention before the fact is generally 
preferable to compensation after the fact, the apparent injury prevention 
effect must be an important factor in the debate about the future of the 
malpractice litigation system.”77  The HMPS also demonstrated that 
patients who were the least likely to sue  – the aged and the poor – were 
the most likely to be negligently injured, precisely the result predicted by a 
standard model of deterrence.  Finally, the HMPS found that the 
experience of being sued “made [doctors] twice as likely to take more time 
in explaining the risks of treatment to their patients,” precisely the 
opposite of the effect predicted by patient safety advocates who argue that 
malpractice liability discourages candor.78  Not surprisingly, the HMPS 
report recommends that policymakers accept and act on the “indication  . . 
. that malpractice litigation does have an injury prevention effect.”79
As the HMPS team readily admits, the evidence of deterrence they 
uncovered, although the best available, is both “limited” and “subject to 
associated with the proportion of hospitalizations involving adverse events and the 
proportion of adverse events involving negligence, [but] the association did not achieve 
statistical significance at the conventional level.  The HMPS investigators struggled with 
how to interpret these results and ultimately settled on this conclusion: ‘Although we did 
observe the hypothesized relationship in our sample—the more tort claims, the fewer 
negligent injuries—we cannot exclude the possibility that this relationship was 
coincidental rather than causal.’”) See also Paul C. Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial 
90 (1991) (suggesting that the HMPS found “only a fairly modest, though statistically 
significant, preventive effect of malpractice litigation is discernible in [the] data.”)  
Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice, supra, at 131 (finding that “tort liability cut the 
frequency of negligence-related injuries by 29 percent per hospital admission and cut the 
overall rate of medical injuries per admission by 11 percent.”).
77
 Id., at 133.
78
 Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice, supra, at 127.
79
 Weiler, A Measure of Malpractice, supra, at 132.  In the face of daunting 
methodological challenges, the HMPS team made several subsequent attempts to model 
the deterrent effects of medical liability, using four different measures of malpractice 
risk, two different outcome measures, and two estimation strategies.  The team was 
unable to agree on the optimal specification of the model and on how to interpret the 
results, so they were never published. 
The problems included (1) multiple possible measures of service quality, none 
of which is clearly superior, that produce different results in regression equations; (2) the 
ambiguity of the intensity of service measure that showed a strong correlation between 
tort risk and service quality in the HMPS; (3) multiple possible measures of malpractice 
risk that yield different results in regression equations; (4) confounding variables, such as 
the hospital-specific case-mix, that HMPS was unable to control for; (5) the enormous 
burden of extracting data on adverse events and negligence from hospital files; and (6) 
the endogeneity of claim rates and error rates, each of which may influence the other.  
See Mello & Brennan, supra, at 1609-1615.  
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methodological criticism.”80  In particular, as they note, the “injury 
prevention effect” may be stronger than they found it to be because 
“constraints on the data set combined to reduce rather than enhance the 
likelihood that such a causal connection would manifest itself.”81  Yet, all 
things considered, the evidence of deterrence is surprisingly tenuous, 
given the salience of malpractice exposure to physicians and other health 
care providers who, if survey responses are to be believed, “alter[] their 
behavior in rendering clinical care” because of it.82  Often-heard 
complaints about “defensive medicine” only make sense if providers 
actually are deterred (in fact, only if they are over-deterred) by the risk of 
liability.   
For current purposes, the more significant point is that none of the 
empirical evidence generated by the HMPS supports the conventional 
wisdom that malpractice liability undermines health care quality.  No 
study has shown that exposure to liability has a statistically significant 
negative effect on the frequency of error reports.  No study has shown that 
liability exposure causes health care quality to decline overall.  Instead, 
the best available evidence shows that liability makes a modest positive 
contribution to patient safety.  The available empirical evidence does not 
support the definitive and unqualified claims made by patient safety 
advocates and other critics of the tort system.
B. TORT LIABILITY AND ANESTHESIA SAFETY: A 
POSITIVE RELATIONSHIP 
Patient safety advocates often use the history of anesthesia to 
demonstrate that health care providers can greatly reduce the frequency of 
iatrogenic injuries by making delivery systems more impervious to human 
errors and mechanical problems.83  As it happens, the example also shows 
that tort liability can motivate providers to identify shortcomings in 
delivery systems and correct them.  Anesthesia  the practice area in 
which the systems-based approach to patient safety has been applied with 
the greatest success  actually undercuts the conventional wisdom.  
80
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81
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82
 Bryan A. Liang, Error in Medicine: Legal Impediments to U.S. Reform, 24 J. Health 
Pol. Pol’y & L. 27, 31 (1999) (citing authorities); Our Common Good, supra at ** (“In 
summary, it is clear that the practice of medicine and the delivery of medical care are 
significantly influenced and shaped by fear of malpractice claims.”)  
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 See, e.g., Leape, supra note   , at   ; Don Berwick, supra note    , at    ; Gawande, supra 
note   , at    .
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Malpractice lawsuits made it advantageous for anesthesiologists and find 
and address the causes of mistakes.
Surgical anesthesia once exposed patients to serious risks of injury 
and death.  Studies conducted in the middle of the 20th century put the 
mortality rate from anesthesia anywhere from 1 in 852 administrations to 
1 in 6,048,84 meaning that 2,000 to 10,000 anesthesia-related deaths 
occurred per year, about half of which were preventable.85  Anesthesia 
mishaps also exposed physicians to serious malpractice risks because the 
injuries patients suffered were exceptionally severe and they had no pre-
existing relationship with the anesthesiologist to temper their willingness 
to bring suit.86  Today, by contrast, anesthesia is exceptionally safe.  In 
approximately a decade, mortality rates fell from 1 in 10,000-20,000 
administrations to 1 in 200,000, a ten- to twenty- fold improvement.87
As anesthesia became safer, lawsuits against anesthesiologists 
became less frequent.  In Massachusetts, claims for hypoxic injury, which 
were extremely expensive, disappeared in 1988, when virtually all 
anesthesiologists started using pulse oximetry and capnography.88  Deaths 
and permanent brain injuries from anesthesia mishaps constituted a 
diminishing fraction of claims,89 and far fewer claims resulted in insurance 
payouts.90  The fraction of total medical malpractice insurance costs 
attributable to anesthesia-related claims fell from 11 percent to 3.6 percent 
84
 A. Goldstein, Jr. & A.S. Keats, The Risk of Anesthesia, 33 Anesthesiology 130 (1970).
85
 Ellison C. Pierce, Jr., The Patient’s Safety in Anesthesia, Resident & Staff Physician 
51, 51 (1989).
86
 E. A. Brunner, The National Association of Insurance Commissioner’s Closed Claim 
Study, in Pierce & Cooper, at 17, 25 (reporting that “anesthesia injuries accounted for 3% 
of all paid claims, but for a disproportionately larege 11% of all dollars indemnified”); id. 
28 (reporting that “claims arising from anesthesia procedures are more costly than those 
arising from any other procedure group”). 
87
 Leape, supra, at 107; Ellison C. Pierce, Jr., Anesthesia: Standards of Care and 
Liability, 262 JAMA 773 (1989).  A recent article suggests that anesthesia safety has not 
improved as much as advertised.  R. S. Lagasse, Anesthesia Safety: Model or Myth, 70 
Anesthesiology 1609 (2002) (finding an anesthesia-related mortality rate of 1 per 13,000 
anesthetics).  One commentator suggests that safety has improved markedly and that 
currently mortality rates reflect the willingness of anesthesiologists to handle much frailer 
patients than before.  See James E. Cottrell, Anesthesia-Related Mortality and New 
Directions: Uncle Sam Wants You, 67 ASA Newsletter (Jan. 2003).
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 Pierce, Anesthesia: Standards of Care and Liability, supra, at 773.
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 F.W. Cheney, Anesthesia Patient Safety and Professional Liability Continue to 
Improve, ASA Newsletter 61(6):18-20, 1997 (“In the 1970s, 56 percent of all claims were 
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over fifteen years.91  “[A]nesthesia medical liability premiums also 
declined significantly.”92  The Controlled Risk Insurance Company 
reduced premiums for anesthesiologists at Harvard hospitals from $17,690 
to $11,750 in one year.93  “The 2002 average premium was $18,000—
about the same as in 1985 and much lower than for other specialties.”94
Anesthesia’s high level of reliability distinguishes it as the only 
medical practice area that approaches industrial standards of quality.95  For 
this reason, patient safety advocates routinely use anesthesia to show the 
gains that can be made by improving health care delivery systems.  By 
studying closed insurance claims and other records, anesthesiologists 
discovered that human errors caused an extremely large fraction of 
anesthesia-related injuries.96  They then redesigned their procedures and 
tools so that fewer errors would occur and so that errors were less likely to 
harm patients.  For example, they shortened residents’ hours, promulgated 
practice guidelines, mandated the use of safety precautions, standardized 
the operation of machines, and outfitted machines with safety devices.  
The rates of morbidity and mortality associated with surgical anesthesia 
fell drastically.  Today, adverse events and emergencies are so rare that 
91
 Id.  
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anesthesiologists have to practice on simulators, including computer-
driven mannequins, to gain experience with them.97
Much of the credit for improving anesthesia safety belongs to the 
American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA).  In 1983, it launched a 
patient safety campaign that included the creation of a Committee on 
Patient Safety and Risk Management, sponsorship of an international 
symposium on anesthesia morbidity and mortality, and initiation of a 
study of malpractice claims closed by insurance companies that continues 
to this day.  The campaign eventually generated a set of mandatory 
anesthesia patient monitoring standards, which the ASA adopted in 1985.  
Why did the ASA act when it did?98  According to Ellison C. 
Pierce, Jr., the leader of the patient safety campaign, “two major factors” 
forced the organization’s hand: malpractice claims and negative publicity.  
“Anesthesiology [malpractice] premiums were … among the very 
highest—in many areas, two to three times the average cost for all 
physicians.  By the early 1980s, anesthesiologists recognized that 
something drastic had to be done if they were going to be able to continue 
to be insured.”  Matters became especially dire after “April 22, 1982, 
when ABC [television] broadcast … ‘The Deep Sleep, 6,000 Will Die or 
Suffer Brain Damage[,]’ … which described a number of anesthesia 
mishaps that appeared to have been preventable.  The reaction of the 
public was strong; for months after the broadcast, patients appearing in the 
operating room for anesthesia had questions about its safety.”99
Decisive pressure to protect patients thus came from outside the 
medical profession, not from within it.  Practicing anesthesiologists tended 
to minimize the frequency and severity of errors and to oppose reforms.  
Dr. Pierce is candid about this fact.  He reports that he and other 
physicians had long known that many or even most anesthesia-related 
deaths and injuries were preventable but had done little to stem the tide.  
97
 See Ellison C. Pierce, Jr., M.D., Forty Years Behind the Mask: Safety Revisited, The 
34th Rovenstine Lecture, Part 5: Enhancing patient safety from the 1980's through the 
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Helmreich, Managing Human Error in Aviation, supra, at 67 (describing a program in 
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He also identifies professional resistance to practice guidelines as a serious 
impediment to patient safety.
What were the challenges?  Clearly, it was obvious that 
many, if not most, physicians resented being told what to 
do.  This, of course, was true in all of medicine, from the 
early guidelines in cardiology concerning emergency 
treatment of a myocardial infarction to the listing of 
indications for carotid artery surgery.  It was assumed by 
many practitioners that any guidelines or standards would 
be fodder for the plaintiff’s attorneys.  This, of course, has 
not been the case.100
As the last two lines suggest, practicing anesthesiologists also blamed 
their woes on lawyers who represented malpractice plaintiffs.  Such 
behavior is well documented, and not restricted to anesthesiologists.101
Until the 1980s, anesthesiologists made important but insufficient 
efforts to study the frequency of anesthesia mishaps, to identify their 
causes, and to establish treatment guidelines and take other prophylactic 
steps.102  The ASA succeeded in dragging a reluctant profession into the 
future of patient safety only because, after two insurance “crises” and a 
hostile television program, the cost of ignoring quality problems was 
unacceptably high.  “[H]ospitals and physicians [became] increasingly 
aware of the need to reduce and control those mishaps and iatrogenic 
events that are preventable … in part [because of] the dramatic rise in 
medical malpractices claims and suits in the United States.”103  By leading 
its members instead of following them, the ASA protected millions of 
patients from harm and thousands of anesthesiologists from malpractice 
claims.  
The ASA’s actions cast serious doubt on the conventional wisdom 
that malpractice lawsuits impede error reduction.  Anesthesiologists 
figured out how to prevent errors from harming patients because of 
100
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101
 See, e.g., Davis, supra, at 37 & 40 (reporting that anesthesiologists responded to 
malpractice suits by heaping scorn upon plaintiffs’ lawyers, insurance companies, and a 
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malpractice exposure, not in spite of it.104  When they did so, lawsuits 
tailed off because uninjured patients had no reason to sue.  
Case studies also show direct connections between liability and 
improved delivery systems for anesthesia.  In one reported incident, a 
patient died because an anesthesiology resident accidentally turned off the 
oxygen supply instead of the nitrous oxide supply.  The hospital’s risk 
managers immediately revealed the error, settled the claim, and assembled 
a team to investigate the cause of the mistake.  The team found that the 
machine involved was a British model that both “differed significantly 
from other anesthesia machines in use at the hospital” and had no “built-in 
fail-safe or alarm systems.”105  Hospital administrators removed the 
machine from service, reviewed the hospital’s policy on the use of oxygen 
analyzers, replaced older machines with newer models, and saw that all 
machines had alarms that sounded when the mixture of oxygen and nitrous 
oxide was unsafe.  All this activity occurred after the malpractice 
settlement, not before it.
The history of anesthesia safety describes a feedback loop running 
between litigation and service quality.  When errors are frequent or have 
serious consequences for patients, lawsuits are brought, saddling providers 
with higher costs in the form of judgments, settlements, legal fees, and 
(mainly) higher insurance premiums.  Providers tolerate these costs until it 
becomes cheaper for them to improve quality than to deal with claims.  
They then figure out what is wrong with their delivery systems and 
improve them.  As quality rises and errors diminish, consumers litigate 
less often and insurance premiums and other liability costs fall.  Fred 
Cheney, the former Chair of the ASA Committee on Professional 
Liability, understood the feedback loop perfectly: “The relationship of 
patient safety to malpractice insurance premiums was easy to predict.  If 
patients were not injured, they would not sue, and if the payout for 
anesthesia-related patient injury could be reduced, then insurance rates 
should follow.”106
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Recent developments raise concern that some doctors have 
forgotten Cheney’s wisdom.  Many elective surgeries that once took place 
in hospitals under the supervision of trained anesthetists now occur in 
physicians’ offices without them.  “Between 1992 and 1999 office-based 
liposuction increased 389 percent; breast augmentation, 413 percent; and 
eyelid surgery, 139 percent.”107  Forty-one thousand office-based surgical 
facilities performed twenty percent of all elective surgeries in 2000, 
including 37 percent of cosmetic procedures and 28 percent of 
reconstructive plastic surgery.108  Because physicians’ offices are 
essentially unregulated, many solo practitioners perform these surgeries 
without the assistance of anesthesiologists.  Some contend that this 
exposes patients to excessive risks.  The Florida Society of
Anesthesiologists—an interested group, admittedly—asserts that “[t]he 
national rate for anesthesia-related deaths in outpatient surgery is about 1 
in 400,000[, b]ut in Florida the rate is about 1 in 8,500 for office 
surgeries.”109  If office-based anesthesia is, in fact, so dangerous, lawsuits 
may be needed to motivate solo practitioners to improve their 
performance.
C. THE HISTORY OF DISCLOSURE AND MEDICAL
LIABILITY IN THE U.S.
Malpractice lawsuits were almost unheard of before the 1840s.  
They were a common species of litigation by that century’s end, however, 
and during the 1900s their frequency rose dramatically.110  If the 
conventional wisdom is right, one might expect providers’ willingness to 
discuss medical errors to reflect this change.  That is, one might expect 
providers to have become more reluctant to identify and reveal errors over 
time.  They should have investigated mistakes and talked about them 
freely when malpractice lawsuits were rare, and they should have become 
ever more tight-lipped as litigation became common.  In the “golden age 
of medicine” before the malpractice era, open communication about errors 
and related matters like treatment risks should have been the norm.
107 Elizabeth M. Lapetina and Elizabeth M. Armstrong, Preventing Errors In The 
Outpatient Setting: A Tale of Three States, 21 Health Affairs (4):26-39 (2002).
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The history of physician disclosure does not support this 
hypothesis.  As Professor Steven Lubet writes,
Forgive me if I appear cynical, but is it really fair to blame 
malpractice lawyers for physicians’ unwillingness to tell 
patients about mistakes?  Was there ever a golden age, 
before rampant malpractice litigation, when doctors 
communicated freely with their patients, openly 
acknowledging errors and confronting mistakes in the spirit 
of humble cooperation?  I don’t think so.  Neither does Dr. 
Jay Katz, who wrote The Silent World of Doctor and 
Patient in the 1980s, long before the current flood of 
malpractice cases.  If anything, the days before the 
malpractice explosion were characterized by less 
communication from doctors, who then routinely refused to 
acknowledge even the possibility of uncertainty.111
In fairness to proponents of the conventional wisdom, Dr. Katz 
focused on the historical failure of physicians to disclose risks, including 
the risk of error, before performing medical procedures.  He did not 
discuss the frequency or content of communications that occurred between 
doctors and patients after medical procedures injured patients.  Yet, it is 
impossible to read his book and not think, as Professor Lubet does, that ex 
post conversations about such matters were rare, and that they rarely 
included candid disclosures of errors or negligence.  Dr. Katz’s thesis is 
that physicians wanted patients to trust them blindly and used silence 
about all technical aspects of treatment to achieve this goal.  It would be 
remarkable if a practice of full and candid disclosure of errors ex post co-
existed with one of near silence on all matters ex ante.  Dr. Katz’s 
observation that physicians maintained power over patients by donning a 
“mask of infallibility” makes the combination seem extremely unlikely.112
If malpractice litigation did cause the demise of a practice of 
complete disclosure of mistakes ex post, one would also expect to find 
mention of this in historical writings on the medical profession.  The 
leading works on the early history of malpractice litigation are by 
Professors James Mohr and Kenneth Allen De Ville.113  A search of their 
111
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writings turned up no indication that physicians once freely investigated 
errors and disclosed them to patients, but stopped doing so for fear of 
malpractice liability.  The omission is telling because these scholars spend 
many pages explaining the effects malpractice lawsuits did have on 
doctors’ practices.  For example, they caused doctors to ask patients for 
liability waivers and bonds, to avoid patients (mainly the working class 
and the poor) who were thought likely to sue, to pressure other physicians 
to refrain from testifying as expert witnesses, and to lobby state legislators 
for reforms.  Yet, neither Professor Mohr nor Professor De Ville asserts 
that malpractice lawsuits ended a practice of discussing errors candidly.
To the contrary, both scholars contend that doctors frequently 
failed to deflate patients’ rising expectations by explaining the limits of 
their knowledge and technologies.  A few physicians showed patients 
frequency tables of poor outcomes associated with procedures like 
amputation and bone-setting, but most did not.  A nineteenth century 
treatise admonished surgeons to “be honest with their patients, apprising 
them of the difficulties of the case and the uncertainties of perfect results. . 
.  They should be candid in regard to their deficiencies, claiming no more 
than they can perform, no more knowledge than they possess.”114  The 
advice was needed because many members of the profession engaged in 
puffery.
Mohr and De Ville also document the medical profession’s history 
of denying errors, of demonizing malpractice plaintiffs and their lawyers, 
of conspiring to make it hard for plaintiffs to find expert witnesses, and of 
threatening to leave patients in the lurch by abandoning their practices.  
Thus, the consistent record of the medical profession is to oppose attempts 
to impose accountability, whether for bad outcomes or for inadequate 
disclosure of risks.  As such, it is hard to credit the claim that physicians at 
one time were enthusiastically communicating with their patients.  It is 
equally hard to believe physicians would begin doing so if the risk of 
liability were lifted.  
If anything, medical liability has encouraged better ex ante 
communication about risks and benefits and fuller ex post communication 
of mistakes.  The AMA’s 1847 Code of Medical Ethics required doctors to 
withhold information that might undermine patients’ confidence, such as 
uncertainty about the right course of action or the existence of divergent 
opinions.115  Judicial decisions imposing legal liability for the failure to 
obtain informed consent led to a change in this rule and fostered greater 
114
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115
 Katz, at 20-22.
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candor.116  The Principles of Medical Ethics, adopted by the AMA in 1980 
and supplemented thereafter, now explicitly recognize the importance of 
obtaining informed consent, and (revealingly) specify that the requirement 
to do so “is based on ‘social policy’ generated by forces outside the 
medical profession.”117
The AMA’s modern ethical guidelines also require physicians to 
disclose mistakes,118 as do the modern rules governing nurses119 and 
hospitals.120  Disclosure does not always occur and fear of malpractice 
liability may affect its frequency or comprehensiveness.  Even so, the rise 
of malpractice litigation as a social phenomenon preceded the 
development of disclosure requirements and account for their 
promulgation.  Medical professionals and medical societies are 
consistently behind the curve.  They have never led the charge to provide 
information about risks and errors to patients. 
D. COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVES
One can also assess the merits of the conventional wisdom through 
a comparative law lens.  If the prevailing view is correct, countries where 
malpractice suits are relatively rare should have fewer medical errors and 
higher levels of communication about errors than the U.S.  The U.K. is 
one such country.  It has dramatically lower rates of malpractice 
litigation121 and offers physicians dramatically lower malpractice 
premiums.122  Those who espouse the conventional wisdom should 
therefore predict better handling of errors in the U.K. than the U.S.
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Comparative data on error rates in the two countries are scarce, 
partly because the study of health care quality in the U.K. is in its 
infancy.123  This itself raises questions about the conventional wisdom.  
Given the rarity of malpractice litigation in the U.K., why aren’t health 
care providers there gathering error-related data routinely (or even as often 
as providers in the U.S.)?  Official publications acknowledge that error 
rates in the U.K. have not been studied with care.  They also state that 
under-reporting of errors is widespread.124  Given the relative infrequency 
of malpractice lawsuits in the U.K., other forces must account for this.
The evidence that is available suggests that, insofar as error rates 
are concerned, the U.K. looks much like the U.S.  In 2000, the Chief 
Medical Officer of the National Health Service (NHS) estimated that 
850,000 serious adverse health care events occur in NHS hospitals each 
year, half of which are thought to be preventable.125 Medication errors are 
thought to “account[] for around a quarter of the incidents which threaten 
patient safety in each country.”126 Whether the subject is inappropriate 
coronary angiography, coronary bypass grafts,127 or anesthesia mortality,128
error rates in the two countries seem to be about the same.129
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When it comes to communication, physicians in the U.K. are 
disinclined to admit medical errors or discuss them with patients even 
though they face much lower risks of malpractice suits.130  At hospitals that 
formally mandate error reporting, between one-third and one-half of all 
patients were not informed that errors had taken place.131  Physicians in the 
NHS also have created a “culture of blame” and “have avoided the tough 
questions of how safety is to become more central to their thinking and 
behaviour.”132  None of this evidence suggests that malpractice litigation 
stifles a natural tendency to report medical mistakes.133
E. DISCLOSURE AND ERROR REPORTING BY 
SPECIALTY, LOCATION, AND TYPE OF ERROR
The consequences of medical errors range from no harm to minor 
short-term inconveniences to major injuries to death.  If the conventional 
wisdom were accurate, one might expect considerable variation in the 
willingness of health care providers to disclose and report errors, 
depending on the risks of litigation and the associated stakes.  For 
example, one might expect providers to report and disclose errors more 
often when injuries are minor or when patients are elderly, poor, or 
otherwise ineligible for large damage awards.  Similarly, it is clear that the 
risks of malpractice liability vary systematically based on a provider’s 
specialty and geographic location.  One might also expect the frequency of 
disclosure and error reporting to vary inversely with these risks.134  We 
have found no evidence that the predicted patterns prevail.
Medical errors come in three types: adverse events, no-harm 
events, and near misses.  An adverse event is one in which an error harms 
a patient.  For example, a patient with a known allergy may be given a 
drug that triggers an allergic response, and thus injures the patient.  In a 
no-harm event, a mistake is made but a patient avoids injury as a matter of 
130
 Lubet, supra, at fn. 84 (citing Charles Vincent, et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors?  A 
Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 Lancet 1609, 1611 (1994).  
131
 Ross, at 494; S.M. Selbst et al., Medication errors in a pediatric emergency 
department, 15 Pediatric Emergency Care 1 (1999).  These studies counted near-misses 
as a medical error, and it is unclear whether the hospital required reporting of such cases.  
However, many reports that should have occurred did not.  
132
 Barach & Small, supra, at 1684.
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luck or chance.  For example, a contraindicated treatment is provided, but 
the patient does not suffer the expected adverse consequences.  A near 
miss occurs when a mistake is made but is caught before treatment occurs.  
For example, a doctor may prescribe a drug that should be withheld from a 
patient but the hospital’s pharmacist may catch the error and refuse to 
dispense it.
No-harm events and near misses occur much more frequently than 
adverse events and are important sources of information about the 
reliability of health care delivery systems.135  For this reason, researchers 
emphasize the importance of learning about them, studying them, and 
correcting them.136  Because these errors do not injure patients, no harm 
events and near misses are not potential sources of malpractice liability 
and are less likely to provoke feelings of guilt or shame.  Evaluations of 
these mistakes also are less likely to be tainted by hindsight bias, which 
may cause negligence to be found more often when patients are known to 
have suffered.137
Because providers face no liability for no-harm events and near 
misses, if the conventional wisdom were correct, one would expect 
providers to report them, study them, and address them aggressively.  In 
fact, providers appear to give near misses and no-harm events less 
attention than adverse events, which they also rarely report.138
Consider a salient anecdote.  Dr. Michael Leonard, an 
anesthesiologist and chief of surgery for Kaiser Permanente in Denver, 
accidentally gave a patient a paralyzing agent instead of the reversal agent 
he meant to administer.  The drugs were kept side by side in the same 
drawer and had similar packaging.  Dr. Leonard simply reached into the 
drawer and grabbed the wrong one.  Fortunately, the paralyzing agent did 
not harm the patient.  When Dr. Leonard discussed the blunder with his 
partners, he learned that four of five had previously made the same 
mistake.  None of the other physicians thought to volunteer this 
information or to devise a systemic solution, even though no liability was 
135 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Do No Harm: Breaking Down Medicine's Culture of Silence, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1999, at D1.  
136
 P. Barach & S. Small, Reporting and preventing medical mishaps: lessons from non-
medical near miss reporting systems. 320 BMJ 759-763 (2000); Jeffrey B. Cooper, 
Toward Prevention of Anesthetic Mishaps, in Pierce & Cooper, ed.s, 167, 181 
(emphasizing importance of studying “minor errors and failures”).
137
 Heidi Wald and Kaveh G. Shojania, Incident Reporting, in AHQR, Evidence 
Report/Technology Assessment, No. 43 (DATE).
138 To Err Is Human, supra, at 29. (noting that only 5.5% of inpatients experiencing an 
adverse drug reaction were reported). 
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involved.  Only when Dr. Leonard took the initiative did a hospital 
pharmacist change the label on the paralyzing agent and put it in a 
separate drawer.139
More systematic research confirms this pattern.  A survey by the 
Institute for Safe Medication Practices found that “it is more likely for 
staff to report errors that actually reach the patient and cause harm” than 
for staff members to report other mistakes.140  The number of respondents 
who thought it “very likely” that practitioners would report harmless 
errors ranged from a high of 30 percent for “[e]rrors that reach the patient 
but cause no harm” to a low of 8 percent for “[p]otentially hazardous 
situations that could lead to an error.”141  Simply stated, “most errors and 
safety issues go undetected and unreported, both externally and within 
health care organizations.”142
A similar dynamic operates with regard to “old” errors.  Providers 
could learn a great deal about the origins of errors by studying patients’ 
charts, as public health researchers have.143  If liability were an important 
impediment to this approach, providers could focus on records sufficiently 
dated that the statute of limitations has run.  The literature on medical 
malpractice and patient safety provides no indication that hospitals or 
other providers have systematically studied “closed” charts.144
There are a variety of reasons why providers might conclude that 
review of closed charts is not cost-effective.  Chart review is not always 
illuminating.  Charts may lack contain the information needed to identify 
mistakes, and the state of medical science can change before the statute of 
limitations runs.  Providers may be satisfied their concurrent review 
practices adequately handle the problem.
The more important point is that, once again, the risk of liability 
turns out to be a relatively unimportant factor in the decision-making of 
individual providers.  As such, one should not expect the elimination or 
restriction of liability to have much of an effect on the patient safety 
efforts of individual providers.  In short, when it comes to preventing 
providers from addressing medical error, tort liability has neither bark nor 
139 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Do No Harm: Breaking Down Medicine's Culture of Silence, 
N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1999, at D1.
140
 ISMP Survey, supra.
141
 Id. (emphasis deleted).
142
 Id. at 37.
143
 Many investigators, including the team that produced the HMPS, have used old files 
to estimate the frequency of patient injuries and medical negligence.  
144
  However, there is evidence that many hospitals are reluctant to review such charts 
when payers ask them to do so, because the review is costly and unreimbursed.  See 
****.
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bite.145  One should not expect providers to report, study, or address no-
harm events and near misses more fully if tort liability were eliminated or 
restricted than they do today. 
F. DISCLOSURE AND ERROR REPORTING BY 
PROVIDERS THAT ARE EXEMPT FROM TORT 
LIABILITY
If the conventional wisdom were accurate, one might expect to 
find cultures of safety, good communication, and superior commitments to 
quality in practice areas where doctors, nurses, and other individuals do 
not face any malpractice suits.  One such place is the Veterans Health 
Administration (VHA), which runs 173 medical centers, more than 771 
ambulatory care facilities and clinics, 134 nursing homes, and many other 
operations.  The VHA served more than 3.4 million veterans in 1998.146
Veterans who are injured during treatment can sue the VHA under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),147 but they cannot sue doctors or 
nurses who are VHA employees.148  These veterans also receive free 
remedial treatments, and many receive monthly disability stipends as well.  
Veterans suffering iatrogenic injuries can obtain these benefits without 
proving fault.
Because the FTCA precludes individual provider liability, the 
conventional wisdom leads one to predict that the VHA would have high 
levels of error reporting and a continuous strong commitment to quality.  
History paints a very different picture.  Although VHA facilities have 
improved remarkably in recent years, for decades they suffered the same 
shortcomings in the areas of data collection and analysis, systems 
145 See also Saks, supra note **, at 1286–87 (“Perhaps the tort system achieves what 
deterrence it does by the unpleasantness of its operation—at least as that is experienced 
or imagined by defendants.  The tort system is a mouse with an otherworldly roar.”).  
146
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147
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148
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Baylor L. Rev. 223, 226 (1995) (“As a U.S. employee, a physician is immune from 
individual malpractice liability.”); Steve S. Kraman and Ginny Hamm, Risk 
Management: Extreme Honesty May Be the Best Policy, 131 Annals of Internal Medicine 
963, 966 (1999) (doctors employed at VA hospitals do not pay malpractice premiums, 
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Wu, Handling Hospital Errors: Is Disclosure the Best Defense?, 131 Annals of Internal 
Medicine 970, 971 (1999) “[G]overnmental physicians are protected from personal 
liability [by the FTCA].”)
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improvement, and service quality as other institutions.149  When patients 
were injured, VHA hospitals made “no organized effort . . . to standardize 
or track the notification of affected patients.”150  Moreover, recent quality 
improvements have resulted mainly from pressure by politicians, 
administrators, and external reviewers.  Health care professionals within 
the VHA did not exert significant influence.  Even today, a punitive and 
fear-inspiring “shame and blame” culture permeates the VHA, despite the 
complete absence of malpractice risk for individual providers.  
Worse still, until quite recently, VHA hospitals had “long [been] 
notorious for serious lapses in medical safety.”151  During the 1970s and 
1980s, official reports indicated the existence of significant quality 
problems in facilities serving veterans’ health care needs.  For example, a 
1985 GAO report found numerous, serious deficiencies in VHA 
performance and monitoring of quality assurance activities.152  Congress 
issued its own critical report on the quality of care rendered by the VHA 
that year.153  Dissatisfied with the efforts of the VHA to improve care, 
Congress enacted legislation requiring the compilation and analysis of 
“mortality and morbidity data for surgical programs, and selected VAMC 
data for specific surgical procedures.”154  Congress also directed the GAO 
to evaluate error reporting within the VHA.  In 1987, the GAO issued a 
report finding that VHA facilities were significantly under-reporting 
patient incidents.155
In the late 1980s and 1990s, these developments led to increased 
external oversight of the VHA, a series of reports by the VHA affirming 
its commitment to quality, and several reorganizations of VHA offices 
responsible for quality assurance.  The VHA also instituted a 
149
 See Robert Pear, Report Outlines Medical Errors in V.A. Hospitals, New York Times, 
Dec. 19, 1999, P. 1 (attributing to Dr. James E. McManus, medical inspector for the 
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150
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comprehensive risk management program requiring disclosure of medical 
errors to patients.156
These recent efforts are paying off.  Reports on adverse drug 
reactions and other medical errors have increased dramatically.157  VHA 
facilities, which scored below other hospitals in JCAHO ratings until 
1990, obtained higher scores than other hospitals during 1991-93 and 
equal scores thereafter.158  VHA’s re-engineered systems improved its 
performance so greatly that, in 2000, VHA outperformed hospitals serving 
Medicare FFS patients on 12 of 13 quality indicators.159  Although VHA 
facilities continue to have problems,160 in some respects they are now 
leaders in quality assurance.161
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The improvements in service quality at VHA facilities are 
impressive and laudable.  By and large, however, forces outside the VHA 
and VHA administrators brought them about.  The medical professionals 
within the VHA simply failed to address the quality problems in the 
system.  There is even evidence that they continue to resist the adoption of 
patient safety measures that were forced upon the VHA by a fed-up 
Congress.162
VHA medical professionals faced no tort liability for negligence, 
but they did not spontaneously create a culture in which doctors and 
nurses routinely reported errors and worked hard to develop better 
delivery systems.  Congress, the public, the press, and certain VHA 
administrators were the quality watchdogs.163  Indeed, the medical 
interactions.  VHA has also advanced the practice of using “predictive models [of] risk-
adjusted surgical outcomes as a means for assessing quality of surgical care. . . .  This 
data enables VHA clinicians to more accurately determine when both poor and 
exceptional outcomes are the direct result of a surgical team’s skill and competence.
162
 As the GAO noted, 
VHA top managers need to recognize and appreciate the fact that the 
several QM [quality management] processes and methodologies, and 
the strong centralized QM oversight and control that VHA adopted in 
the period from 1985 to 1995, were developed in response to 
Congressional and public perceptions that VA did not practice sound 
and effective patient care.  These perceptions were based on the reality 
of a few very seriously flawed cases that prevailing VHA QM 
processes failed to recognize or address.”  
GAO, VA Patient Safety: Initiatives Promising but Continued Progress Requires Culture 
Change, GAO/T-HEHS-00-167 5 (2000).  In 1997, OIG observed that consistent 
implementation of VHA QM policies by clinicians “has always been, and continues to 
be, a problem.  Inconsistent and ineffective policy adherence, plus the failure to use the 
latest available information to improve systems, render policies ineffective and create the 
impression that QM efforts are wasted.”  In testimony delivered to Congress in 2000, the 
GAO reported, “VA will face significant challenges to ensure the success of its patient 
safety effort.  In particular, establishing a culture of safety . . . will require sustained 
commitment to effect permanent change.”  A follow up letter identified the problem more 
precisely:
VA needs to overcome obstacles that impede the move from a “blame 
and shame” way of handling adverse events to a culture of safety that 
looks openly at how and why adverse events occur and how systems 
can be improved to prevent them in the future. . . .  VA must convey 
the message to all its employees that patient safety is everyone’s 
responsibility. . . .
The GAO closed its letter by noting that the VA would soon survey its employees to 
learn whether they felt “safe enough to report adverse events.”  GAO, Response to 
Questions from Hearing on Patient Safety and Quality of Care at VA Facilities, supra, 
pp. 3-4.  
163
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resembles private health care providers.  See Neils F. Jensen and John H. Tinker, Quality 
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professionals working in VHA facilities created a long-lasting punitive 
culture that discouraged transparency, error reporting and disclosure.164
The existence and persistence of this culture in the absence of personal 
legal liability for mistakes undermine the conventional wisdom’s claim 
that malpractice exposure poisons a well that would otherwise be pure.
G. DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND LIABILITY
Proponents of the conventional wisdom often cite “defensive 
medicine” as an example of the tendency of tort liability to degrade health 
care quality.  Defensive medicine occurs when a provider orders a test or 
procedure that has little or no utility for a patient solely to reduce the risk 
of a lawsuit.165  Doctors, medical societies, insurers, and tort reform groups 
argue that the defensive medicine is widespread.166  Common Good, an 
organization that opposes the use of courts to regulate physicians, 
contends that defensive medicine costs more than $100 billion per year.167
The empirical evidence supporting claims of defensive medicine is 
far from conclusive, and it appears that Common Good’s claims are 
grossly exaggerated.168  “Most defensive medicine studies have failed to 
demonstrate any real impact on medical practice arising from higher 
malpractice premiums."169  In 2003, the Congressional Budget Office 
Improvement p. 7 (undated ms) (observing that few of the efforts hospitals and physicians 
made in the 1980s to meet quality guidelines “was generated spontaneously from within 
these health care provider groups; most was in reluctant response to external pressure” 
from regulators, accrediting organizations, and professional associations).
164
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consistently communicated a strong pro-safety message, a cultural transformation might 
occur in 5 to 7 years.)
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studied Medicare patients treated for a broad range of conditions.  It 
“failed to find any impact of state tort laws on medical spending.”170
The difficulty of proving that malpractice exposure generates a 
particular level of defensive medicine arises because providers may have 
many reasons for performing “unnecessary” tests and procedures, 
including greater risk-aversion, a difference of opinion as to comparative 
utility, and the desire to generate income.  As such, it is problematic to 
blame the liability system as the sole cause of spending on unnecessary 
procedures and tests.  
An alternative formulation of the defensive medicine claim argues 
that malpractice liability and high insurance premiums cause providers to 
abandon high-risk specialties and to flee states with pro-patient tort 
regimes.  For example, the AMA contends that family physicians are 
refusing to deliver babies and that access crises exist in 19 states.171
Again, the supporting evidence is shaky.  A 2003 GAO report found 
isolated examples of access problems in some rural areas, but it also found 
that Medicare patients continued to receive high-risk procedures at stable 
or rising rates in so-called “crisis” states.172  Moreover, even if evidence of 
significant access denials existed, it would show only that the tort system, 
mediated through the cost of malpractice coverage, has a deterrent effect.  
A reduction in service availability could mean that inferior providers are 
leaving a field.  The assertion that access reductions are always bad rests 
on an unarticulated (and indefensible) assumption that providers have an 
absolute and unrestricted right to determine the scope and location of their 
practices.
Finally, if one assumes for the sake of argument that defensive 
medicine and physician flight are genuine problems, the conventional 
wisdom seems less persuasive, not more.  The conventional wisdom 
denies that tort punishments deter providers from making mistakes.  Yet, 
complaints about defensive medicine and physician flight make sense only 
if providers respond to punishments rationally, that is, by avoiding them.  
But if providers are rational, they should also seek to avoid liability by 
reducing both the frequency of errors and the severity of the harm errors 
170
 GAO-03-836, Medical Malpractice: Implications of Rising Premiums on Access to 
Health Care 29 (2003) (citing U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Cost 
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Act of 2003 (March 2003).
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25% of health care institutions have reacted to the liability crisis by cutting back on 
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cause.  The defensive medicine critique of tort liability assumes that 
rational providers respond to liability risks only by taking steps that harm 
patients.  This is implausible.173
If tort reformers were genuinely worried about defensive medicine 
and genuinely desired to prevent it, they would offer vastly different 
proposals from the ones they now endorse.  For example, a concern about 
unnecessary tests and procedures might lead them to call for evidence-
based treatment guidelines specifying that certain tests need not be 
performed.  A concern about impaired access might lead them to propose 
premium subsidies for obstetricians and other providers in high-risk 
fields.174  Instead, tort reformers propose caps on non-economic damages 
and contingent fees, federal reforms, and other measures that are poorly 
adapted to the problems of defensive medicine and provider flight.175  It is 
particularly hard to reconcile the complaint that providers are fleeing pro-
plaintiff states with calls for tort reform at the federal level. 
H. ACTUAL PRACTICES OF DISCOVERING AND
DISCLOSING ERRORS
The conventional wisdom posits that liability encourages providers 
to ignore errors and to hide mistakes of which they become aware.  
Ignorance and secrecy are said to be dominant strategies because they 
shield providers from liability.176  Ignorance and secrecy can either reduce 
the likelihood that patients will learn about errors and sue or make it 
harder for patients to establish causation.
Ignorance and secrecy certainly are possible responses to liability 
risks, but they are not the only choices available.  Investigation and 
disclosure are options as well.177  These alternatives also come in various 
degrees.  Consider disclosure.  One can reveal an error to one’s 
173
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colleagues, to one’s patient, or to both.  One can be candid and lay out 
everything one knows, or one can be strategic and say only certain things.  
One can admit error and apologize, admit error but not apologize, or 
apologize but not admit error.  Finally, when disclosing, one can offer or 
not offer compensation, and one can be more or less generous when doing 
the former.  In practice, providers vary tremendously in their choice of 
strategy.  
In a survey of risk managers at a random sample of hospitals, 
“[v]irtually all . . . reported disclosing harms to patients at least some of 
the time, and 80 percent had disclosure policies in place or under 
development.”178  Fifty-four percent of the respondents said their hospitals 
routinely told patients or their families when patients were harmed by 
care.  Only five percent of risk managers said their hospitals never 
disclosed mistakes.179
Hospitals also varied tremendously in what they disclosed.  The 
most common elements were an explanation, an undertaking to investigate 
the incident, an apology, and acknowledgement of harm.  Relatively few 
respondents reported that a typical disclosure included a declaration of 
responsibility for the harm or a promise to share investigation results with 
the patients or their families.  However, 17% of the respondents indicated 
that disclosures at their hospitals routinely included both a declaration of 
responsibility and a promise to share the results of any investigation with 
the patient.  A majority of hospitals also waived the costs of treatment 
associated with the error, but few offered compensation or referrals to 
support groups, regulatory agencies, or lawyers.180
Disclosure to co-workers is also frequent.  A study of physicians in 
training found that “[m]istakes were discussed in attending rounds in 57% 
of cases and at the morning report or morbidity and mortality conference 
in 31% of cases.”181  One of the seminal books on medical sociology 
focuses on how error is formally and informally recognized, discussed, 
and addressed in a surgical residency training program.182
The frequency of disclosure belies the assertion that, in the face of 
liability risks, secrecy is the only viable course.  The diversity of existing 
practices shows that deciding how to respond to errors and liability risks is 
not a simple matter.  Risk managers appear to have widely varying ideas 
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about the optimal approach.183  The statement “liability causes providers to 
do X,” is obviously a dramatic over-simplification of what occurs in the 
real world.  
A growing body of evidence also suggests that hiding mistakes is 
not necessarily cost-minimizing.  Providers that discuss mistakes with 
patients openly and forthrightly may get sued less often than providers that 
hide them.184  As Professor Haavi Morreim has noted, “often, the strongest 
predictor of whether a physician will be sued is the extent to which 
patients feel they are being treated with honesty, respect, and personal 
interest.”185
Consider the experience of the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in 
Lexington, Kentucky.  “In 1987, after losing two malpractice judgments 
totaling more than $1.5 million,” risk managers adopted a new policy of 
identifying and investigating accidents and incidents of malpractice.186
The policy included a practice of disclosing substandard conduct even 
when patients and their caregivers neither knew about it nor would likely 
have discovered it on their own.  Hospital employees even tracked down 
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discharged patients, gave them the facts, and “persuade[d] the occasional 
reluctant victim to accept financial compensation.”187
This disclosure practice constituted a complete reversal of the 
Lexington facility’s prior method of responding to medical errors, which 
“was an adversarial combination of little disclosure and much 
opposition.”188  It is also noteworthy for two other reasons: the practice 
was unique among VHA facilities when adopted, and it did not precipitate 
a liability crisis.  To the contrary, although the number of claims 
increased—an obvious implication of a policy to reveal mishaps patients 
would not have learned about by other means—the policy saved money 
overall by enabling the Lexington facility to resolve claims much more 
cheaply than other VA facilities.189  Other hospitals have adopted similarly 
expansive disclosure strategies with similarly positive results.190  These 
reports find support in studies suggesting that patients who are dealt with 
openly and honestly are less likely to sue.191
Businesses outside the health care industry have had analogous 
experiences.  In 1991, the Toro Company, a manufacturer of lawncare 
products, switched from a strategy of defending all claims aggressively to 
a less confrontational approach.  By 1996, the average lifespan of its cases 
had dropped from 24 months to 4 months, average payouts had fallen from 
$68,368 to $18,594, average costs and fees had gone from $47,252 to 
$12,023, and average total cost per claim had declined from $115,620 to 
$30,617.192  Reflecting the improvement, Toro’s liability carrier reduced 
its premiums by $1.8 million over three years.  Overall, the conciliatory 
approach saved Toro an estimated $75 million between 1992 and 1999.
A practice of dealing with errors honestly and forthrightly may be 
less expensive than a policy of hiding them, but Professor Brian Liang 
contends that this option is not available to insured providers.  He bases 
this conclusion on the fact that medical malpractice policies typically 
require policyholders to refrain from making statements and taking other 
actions that would undermine carriers’ ability to defend claims.  Liang 
187
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argues that this requirement means that providers jeopardize their 
coverage by dealing with errors openly and forthrightly.193
If Liang is right, the desire to maintain insurance coverage creates 
a strong disincentive for disclosure.  However, although his analysis 
sounds plausible, Liang cites no cases in which insurers disclaimed 
coverage for the reason he identifies.  Because many hospitals disclose 
errors routinely – and some disclose them extensively – one would expect 
to find at least one such case if any existed.  Similarly, one would expect 
to find evidence of adverse insurer behavior (including reservation of 
rights letters) in continuing education materials aimed at medical 
malpractice and insurance lawyers.  We were unable to locate any 
instances of such behavior by liability insurers – suggesting that the 
“problem” is more theoretical than real.  
Liang’s argument also omits an important step.  It is far from clear 
that courts would allow insurance carriers to disclaim coverage when 
providers disclose mistakes.  JCAHO accreditation standards, ethics rules 
governing medical professionals, and some state laws require disclosures.  
These requirements, which insurance companies know about when writing 
coverage, embody important public policies.  Courts could easily conclude 
that public policy considerations prohibit carriers from withdrawing 
coverage when providers tell patients about mistakes.
In sum, the conventional wisdom dramatically oversimplifies and 
overstates the relationship between liability and secrecy.  Neither liability 
itself nor related insurance concerns inevitably drive providers to hide 
errors.  Many providers hide or ignore mistakes, but many also disclose 
them, and disclosures come in varying degrees of comprehensiveness.  
Secrecy may be a strategy some providers chose, but others have opted for 
honesty and openness, with good results.  This diversity of disclosure 
strategies suggests that liability is not a substantial factor driving secrecy.  
The decision to communicate or keep quiet is a strategy choice that the 
existence of tort liability, standing alone, may have little power to explain.
I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
The conventional wisdom is that medical malpractice liability 
impedes the improvement of health care quality by discouraging providers 
from reporting mistakes.  Although it is widely accepted, the conventional 
wisdom has little support.  No empirical study has yielded a negative 
correlation between the intensity of the malpractice risk and the frequency 
193
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of error reporting.  Nor has any study shown that liability correlates 
inversely with health care quality.  The authors of the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study reached the opposite conclusion, finding that liability deters 
errors and protects patients with some frequency.
A good deal of other evidence undermines the conventional 
wisdom as well.  Anecdotal reports show that lawsuits sometimes 
motivate providers to address long-standing problems and that high 
malpractice premiums account for dramatic improvements in anesthesia 
safety.  Lawsuits appear to have increased communication between 
physicians and patients about treatment risks by creating the doctrine of 
informed consent.  Lawsuit also appear to have encouraged 
communication about errors, by causing professional and industry 
associations to promulgate guidelines requiring disclosure.  Error 
reporting is not more frequent in the U.K. than the U.S., even though 
malpractice suits are far more common in the latter.  If anything, systems 
for gathering information about errors and health care quality are more 
developed in the U.S., suggesting that liability and provider interest in 
errors correlate positively.  Reports of near misses and no harm events are 
rare even though these mistakes do not saddle providers with liability.  
Under-reporting and a punitive practice culture were serious problems at 
VHA hospitals, even though the FTCA protected doctors and nurses who 
work there from malpractice suits.  Finally, the diversity of disclosure 
practices prevailing at hospitals across the U.S. shows that secrecy is not 
the only plausible response to liability.  Providers may even fare better by 
disclosing errors than by hiding them.  
In sum, the case for the conventional wisdom has not been made 
and the best available evidence actually undermines the conventional 
wisdom.  The view that liability exposure hinders quality improvement by 
driving errors underground has been accepted uncritically.  When 
considered carefully, it is no more plausible, and is, in fact, less plausible, 
then the assertion that liability protects patients by deterring mistakes.
If the liability system is not responsible for the continuing failure 
of providers to improve health care quality, what is?  And why is the 
positive impact of tort law on health care quality so weak?  Parts V and VI 
address these questions.
V. Professional Norms and Economic Incentives as Causes of 
Quality Problems
The existence of high error rates in health care should surprise no 
one.  High error rates are predictable whenever human beings provide 
services via complex delivery systems.  Human beings routinely make 
mistakes – even when they exercise due care.  Health care systems are 
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exceptionally complicated.194  Consequently, the many frailties that afflict 
human behavior—including sensory limitations, flawed decision heuristics 
and empirical theories, information overload, emotions and other 
distractions, fatigue and other physical problems, defective motivations, 
training limitations, and forces beyond human control—have ample room 
to operate.  The result is that mistakes are inevitable in the delivery of 
health care services.195
The surprising thing, in the health care sector and elsewhere, is that 
consistent high-quality performance ever occurs.  Errors are inevitable, but 
error detection, correction, and prevention are not.  All three activities 
require continuous commitment, money, and hard work.  Yet, many 
industries outside the health care sector have brought error rates under 
control.  They have designed delivery systems that achieve “six sigma” 
levels of quality, where defects occur fewer than four times in every 
million opportunities.  
Transporting the error rates that are common in the health care 
sector to other commercial settings dramatizes the strides other industries 
have made. 
If the performance of certain high-reliability industries, 
whose standards of excellence we take for granted, 
suddenly deteriorated to the level of most health care 
services, some astounding results would occur.  At a defect 
rate of 20 percent, which occurs in the use of antibiotics for 
colds, the credit card industry would make daily mistakes 
on nine million transactions; banks would deposit 36 
million checks in the wrong accounts every day; and deaths 
from airplane crashes would increase one thousand-fold.196
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An error rate of 20 percent would be intolerable in the business settings 
identified, but error rates as high as 70 percent have been observed in 
health care.  
High error rates should be intolerable in health care.  Providers 
have hundreds of millions of opportunities to deliver health care services 
every year.  A one percent error rate means millions of mistakes, many of 
which have significant potential to harm patients.  The history of 
anesthesia safety shows that health care providers can do better.  
Significant variations in error rates across providers show this too.  It is 
therefore natural to ask why health care quality is lagging.  The question 
has several answers, two of which we concentrate on here: professional 
norms and economic self-interest.
A. PROFESSIONAL NORMS OF MEDICINE 
To correct errors, one must identify them first.  Unfortunately, 
errors often hide from view.  They can be especially hard to spot when 
superior performance can generate bad results and inferior performance 
can generate good results.  This is true in health care.  Many patients die
even when given the best of care, and some patients survive despite 
providers’ mistakes.  Because neither death nor survival is a perfect 
marker for service quality, effort is needed to identify inferior procedures 
and mistakes.197
To identify superior procedures and providers, one may have to 
conduct statistical studies that aggregate large numbers of patients and 
adjust for pre-existing health risks.  This was true for CABG providers.  
Until studies were run that compared surgeons and cardiac care units and 
that adjusted for patients’ physical condition, abnormally high mortality 
rates for CABG patients escaped everyone’s attention.  CABG providers 
attributed negative outcomes to nature until studies forced them to focus 
on themselves, their institutional arrangements, and their surgical 
procedures.
Health care providers are rarely trained or equipped to identify 
iatrogenic injury.  Consequently, they often miss mistakes.198  Health care 
providers also rarely benchmark their performance against others’.  
197
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Consequently, they often think existing rates of mortality and morbidity 
are natural and irreducible when they actually reflect inferior performance.  
Human frailties exacerbate this tendency.  Even when it is clear that 
iatrogenic injury occurred and that treatment decisions were erroneous, 
health care providers are extraordinarily reluctant to identify these 
problems.199  They appear to have a reverse-hindsight bias that causes 
them to regard preventable injuries as inevitable.  Whatever the cause, the 
tendency of providers to underestimate the frequency of iatrogenic injury 
is well known.200
Now consider error correction.  If people must be trained to 
identify mistakes, they must be motivated to report them and address them 
as well.  Many workers are naturally inclined to ignore mistakes or hide 
them.  “Errors bring up feelings of shame, and we would rather not 
confront the bad feelings associated with our failures as individuals.”201  In 
many organizations, including hospitals, workers also face pressures 
(having nothing to do with liability) to hide errors and other problems that 
come to their attention, and to avoid accepting responsibility or blame.202
Error correction also receives less emphasis than it should because 
human beings working in organizations tend to focus on successes.203  A 
99% success rate and a 1% failure rate are factually equivalent, but the 
psychological implications of focusing one or the other can be profound.  
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Focusing on success rates leads to complacency and self-satisfaction; 
focusing on failure rates does not.204  This is why businesses that cannot 
afford even one-percent defect rates, businesses like commercial aviation, 
banking, information technology, and manufacturing, train employees to 
be obsessive about errors.
Yet, the human tendency to focus on successes (of which there are 
many in health care) blinds providers (and often the public) to the 
magnitude of the problem.205  The 1999 IOM report made the splash it did 
because it framed the problem of medical error in terms of failure rates.  In 
the U.S., it is true both that one can obtain the best available care for most 
maladies and that health care errors are the eighth leading cause of death.  
The IOM triggered a firestorm of controversy and the creation of several 
government commissions by focusing on failures instead of successes.
Medical schools and other training programs for health care 
professionals do not teach modern quality assessment and improvement 
techniques.206  Instead, they teach students to make independent judgments 
and to treasure clinical autonomy.  This training may often benefit patients 
by supplying them with agents who have the confidence to do what is 
right.  But professional independence can have a significant downside for 
patients as well.  A great deal of uncertainty exists about “best” treatments 
for clinical conditions, and about the “best” way of performing them.  The 
efficacy of most medical treatments has never been proved, and many 
treatments arguably have upside potential.  Many treatments also can be 
administered in a variety of ways.  Given these uncertainties, independent 
medical agents have significant discretion to recommend procedures that 
may be sub-par and to implement procedures in sub-optimal ways.
This state of uncertainty gives medical professionals, especially 
physicians, considerable freedom and power.  Physicians have freedom 
because they can form a wide range of judgments.  They have power 
because patients will rely on their judgments, enabling them to control 
enormous resource flows.  Efficacy studies, clinical practice guidelines, 
and other quality improvement devices are likely to constrain their 
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judgment and reduce their importance by excluding options and making 
the delivery of services more routine.  
To put the point another way, although medical schools encourage 
doctors to exercise good judgment, they have not focused their efforts on 
Total Quality Management or Evidence-based Medicine.207  Instead, they 
have historically emphasized self-reliance and inculcated a belief in 
hierarchical systems of authority.208  A person taught to act independently 
will naturally regard many quality improvement innovations as threats, 
especially innovations like evidence-based treatment guidelines and 
computerized diagnostic and risk-assessment tools that have demonstrated 
their superiority to clinician’s subjective judgments.209  Physicians often 
deride such approaches as “cookbook medicine,” and non-physicians have 
historically deferred to doctors on quality-related issues.  
Cookbook approaches have the singular virtue of squeezing out 
inefficient and potentially dangerous individual variation.  No airplane 
pilot committed to passenger safety (or self-preservation) would complain 
about having to practice “cookbook flying” by following a checklist 
before taking off.210  Pre-flight checklists, routine maintenance guidelines, 
practice with flight simulators, crew resource management training 
programs, and other mechanisms that make flying routine save lives.  By 
using these strategies, commercial airline companies have reduced 
accident rates enormously.  The accident rate for the U.S. and Canada 
exceeded 25 per million departures in 1959.  It was less than 1 per million 
departures in 1980 and has remained low ever since.211  Now “more than 
10 million takeoffs and landings [occur] each year [in the U.S.] with an 
average of fewer than four crashes a year,” and there have been years in 
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which no passengers on U.S. commercial airlines perished because of 
accidents during flight.212
Not all pilots supported “cookbook flying” initially.  Many resisted 
efforts to control their judgment and discretion.  Many also interacted with 
other members of flight crews in counterproductive ways.  “The airline 
industry was shocked to realize that well-trained and technically proficient 
crews could crash airworthy craft because of failures of human interaction 
and communication—areas in which neither training nor formal evaluation 
was required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or any other 
country’s regulatory agency.”213  The need for training in human 
interaction became clear when studies showed that human errors played a 
role in 70 percent of airline accidents and “that most of these errors 
stemmed from failures in communication, teamwork and decision making 
rather than from technical shortcomings.”214  Commercial air 
transportation is exceptionally safe today partly because pilots learned to 
follow rules and to cooperate with subordinates.
Many health care professionals need to learn how to work for 
safety too.215  “A number of observers have noted large-scale obstacles to 
promotion of safety culture within healthcare[, including] a pervasive 
culture of blame that impedes acknowledgment of error, and professional 
‘silos’ that offer unique challenges to changing any universal aspect of 
healthcare, including culture.”216 As Ellison Pierce observed when 
discussing doctors’ disdain for guidelines, “many, if not most, physicians 
resented being told what to do.”217  Medical professionals often resist 
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efforts to standardize treatments even when shown that guidelines yield 
good results.218
The experience of The Leapfrog Group (Leapfrog), an initiative 
created by the Business Round Table that comprises more than 150 large 
health care payers, indicates the problem.  Leapfrog champions three 
hospital-based patient-safety practices: computerized physician order entry 
(CPOE), evidence-based hospital referral (EHR), and ICU physician 
staffing (IPS).219  When a recent survey found that hospitals had made little 
progress in implementing these practices, Leapfrog learned that 
[h]ospitals’ efforts to meet the three Leapfrog standards 
often are seen by physicians as restricting their autonomy 
and reducing their productivity and income….  One 
hospital respondent captured the general sentiment well, 
noting that one of the “fastest ways to the CEO graveyard 
is to push physicians too hard and fast on patient safety and 
quality improvement.”220
Resistance to guidelines has also slowed the progress of the movement for 
evidence-based medicine (EBM), a philosophy that grounds treatments in 
the best available studies of effectiveness.  It is easier for providers to use 
familiar practices than to keep up with the rapidly expanding literature on 
health care.  Consequently, providers often employ treatments and 
procedures that are known to be inefficacious, obsolete, or dangerous.221  It 
also is easier for providers to do what others in their communities do than 
to base their decisions on science.  Consequently, treatment practices often 
vary from place to place for no good reason.222
Providers also resist efforts to evaluate the quality of the care they 
provide.223  In New York, cardiac surgeons tried to stop the Department of 
Health from publishing risk-adjusted mortality rates for CABG providers.  
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When they failed, some attempted to “game” the system by reporting that 
their patients were sicker (and thus at greater risk of dying) than they 
actually were.  In Kentucky, providers used their state hospital association 
to lobby against an effort by Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield to 
benchmark the quality of cardiac surgery units.  Anthem had previously 
studied cardiac surgery units in Ohio and found a six-fold variation in risk-
adjusted mortality rates.  Public health researchers also report that “health 
plans and hospitals that have low quality of care scores often stop 
participating in voluntary public reporting efforts.” 224  Evidently, many 
hospital administrators prefer hiding problems to revealing them.
Many health care workers also seem to prefer a punitive practice 
environment to a non-punitive one.  A non-scientific survey conducted by 
the Institute for Safe Medication Practices found high percentages of 
persons employed in medical facilities who believed that non-punitive 
environments increase error rates by tolerating mistakes.225 It should
surprise no one that these attitudes prevail, despite holding back quality 
improvement.  To achieve remarkable levels of consistency, one must stop 
blaming errors on “bad people” and start treating errors as natural and 
predictable occurrences that shed light on problems of system design.  
Improving systems takes time, effort, and money.  Data must be gathered 
and studied.  Systems must be mapped and sources of errors identified.  
Improvements must be designed and implemented.  These activities 
require personnel training and continuing education, expert consultants, 
and new equipment.  These activities also require people to confront the 
awkward, embarrassing, impolitic, and shameful reality that a mistake has 
occurred on their watch.226  Given these costs, many providers have found 
it easier to ignore problems, focus on their successes, and hope for the 
best.
Modern quality consultants emphasize that errors are opportunities 
to improve.  They also know that environments in which errors are 
identified and analyzed do not arise spontaneously.227  Good attitudes must 
224
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Quality-of-Care Scores and HMO’s Subsequent Public Disclosure of Quality-of-Care 
Scores, 288 JAMA 1484-1490 (2002)).
225
 Institute for Safe Medication Practices, ISMP survey on perceptions of a nonpunitive 
culture produces some surprising results, Medication Safety Alert!, August 22, 2001.
226
 For an excellent account of the efforts needed to create a culture of safety at one 
hospital, see Eric B. Larson, Measuring, Monitoring, and Reducing Medical Harm from a 
Systems Perspective: A Medical Directors’s Personal Reflections, 77 Academic Medicine 
993 (Oct. 2002).
227
 See, e.g., Chip Caldwell et all, ER Six Sigma Effort Results in 50% Satisfaction 
Improvement and $4 Million Cost Recovery, Part 3, HealthLeaders, 
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be nurtured.  Yet, most “physicians lack training in the principles of 
quality improvement.”228  Good attitudes must also be recognized and 
rewarded.  Yet, hospitals and physicians often lose money by improving 
quality, as shown further below.  Given the training providers do 
receive—which inculcates them into a culture of shaming and blaming 
people for mistakes—and their incentives—which make errors 
profitable—it is surprising that attitudes conducive to patient safety exist 
at all.
B. ECONOMICS
From an economic perspective, the key issue is whether there is a 
“business case for quality.”  A business case for quality exists when a 
provider can earn a profitable financial return on a quality-enhancing 
investment.229  The investment may bring in new patients, reduce costs, or 
benefit a provider in other ways.  Absent a business case, there is no 
reason to expect a private provider to bear the cost of improving quality, 
even when an improvement is economically efficient and socially 
desirable.230
Unfortunately, even when quality improvements are cost-justified 
and otherwise desirable overall, the business case for quality often is weak 
or nonexistent.  This is true largely because of the way health care in the 
U.S. is financed and delivered.
Third-party payers underwrite most health care expenses, and third 
party payment arrangements create a variety of problems.  First, they 
cause payers and patients to have inconsistent interests.  Payers bear the 
bulk of the cost of health care; patients enjoy most of the benefits.  Payers 
therefore have an incentive to reduce costs at the expense of quality while 
patients want ever-higher levels of service even when the marginal 
benefits of additional care are far less than the marginal costs.231  Both sets 
room by “chang[ing] the staff belief system from ‘good enough’ to a world class 
performance mindset, and that “[o]f all the activities, the Belief System Transformation 
effort has been the most time consuming, yet vital”).
228
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of defective incentives contribute to the quality problems that plague the 
U.S.
Because payers are more interested in costs than benefits, they 
have not historically exerted pressure on providers to improve.  This 
dynamic has changed somewhat in recent years, partly because employers 
lost the battle to control costs directly.  When providers and patients 
crippled employers’ efforts to use MCOs to control costs, employers 
looked for alternatives.232  Some latched onto the mantra of the Total 
Quality Management movement that quality improvements save money.233
A movement to measure the quality of care and to track improvements 
emerged.  However, the movement has enjoyed only partial success, and 
the fundamental interest in cost-reduction remains.234
Employers’ focus on costs undoubtedly contributes to the fact that 
providers’ compensation is quality-invariant.  As outlined previously, 
superior providers and inferior providers generally receive similar 
payments.  In a world where payers care more about expense than quality, 
this approach makes sense.  Level compensation also meshes well with 
providers’ historical preference for fee-for-service compensation over all 
other arrangements (and especially over arrangement that condition the 
right to payment on the production of measurable results).  
Third party payment arrangements also cause problems because 
subscriber pools change when patients change employers or health plans.  
This turnover is a source of problems when returns on investments in 
quality appear long after services are delivered.  For example, disease 
prevention programs directed at employees in their thirties and forties may 
greatly reduce health care costs in employees’ retirement years, but if few 
232
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younger employees stay with a company long enough to retire, the savings 
to the employer may not justify the cost.  When costs are internalized but 
benefits are externalized, investments in quality are unlikely to be made.
Case studies confirm these theoretical predictions.235  Employee
turnover and a temporal mismatch between costs and benefits undermined 
the financial viability of diabetes case management, smoking cessation 
programs, and lipid clinics.  Programs beneficial to heart disease patients 
and children with asthma encountered serious financial difficulties 
because fewer hospitalizations and ER visits, shortened hospital stays, and 
reduced use of oxygen and medications meant lower revenues.236  Many 
programs suffer because quality improvements do not translate into larger 
market shares.237  Researchers supported by the Commonwealth Fund, 
which sponsored a series of case studies of cost-efficient quality 
improvements, found that “in all cases where the investing organization 
[was] a provider, the business case [was] unfavorable.”238
The Leapfrog Group’s experience also is representative.  As 
mentioned, Leapfrog found that hospitals made little progress 
implementing its three preferred patient safety practices—computerized 
physician order entry (CPOE), ICU physician staffing, and evidence-based 
hospital referral—even though the social benefits of these practices are 
known to exceed their social costs.  Investigations consistently identified 
deficient private incentives as a cause.  “CPOE is perceived to be costly 
and risky.  The hardware and software upgrades needed are expensive and 
require significant staff training time, and productivity often declines 
during implementation.”239  Similarly, “ICU physician staffing may result 
in a loss of hospital revenue under certain circumstances and payment 
methods.  For example, if health plans do not provide a bonus for 
improvement in this area and the hospital is being paid on a discount off 
charges or per-diem basis, use of intensivists may result in a loss of 
hospital revenue because patients’ length of stay declines.  Moreover, 
intensivists do not necessarily order more billable services, such as 
235
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diagnostic tests.”240  Finally, “evidence-based hospital referral can lead to 
declines in hospital revenue …  Four of the six high-risk procedures for 
which Leapfrog set volume thresholds are cardiovascular procedures, 
which are relatively profitable for hospitals.5 As a result, hospitals are 
reluctant to give up referrals and the associated revenue if they do not 
meet the volume thresholds.”241
Those who still doubt that provider self-interest offers a robust 
explanation for the current state of affairs should consider the comparative 
availability of computerized user-friendly billing programs and 
computerized user-friendly clinical treatment programs.  Software that 
avoids billing errors is readily available and most providers have it.  By 
contrast, software for clinical treatment programs has lagged.  This 
outcome is quite predictable from an economic perspective: “[t]he 
development of medical applications of information technology has 
largely been commercially funded, and reimbursement has rewarded 
excellent billing rather than outstanding clinical care.  As a result, the 
focus has been more on products to improve the ‘back-office’ functions 
related to clinical practice than on those that might improve clinical 
practice itself.”242
In sum, health care providers have worried less about quality than 
they should have because they were not paid to do so.243  Altruism, 
education, lofty ethical standards, demanding norms of patient service, 
good character, licensure, reputational concerns, desire for referrals, report 
cards, and a highly punitive culture have undoubtedly motivated providers 
to make many improvements, but they have failed to bring health care up 
to industrial standards of quality.  Anesthesiologists knew that patient 
240
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241
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monitors detected misintubations but did not use them because they were 
expensive.244  Hospitals know that computerized physician order entry 
systems greatly reduce the frequency of medication mistakes but do not 
use them because they are expensive.245  Doctors know that electronic 
medical records (EMRs) improve the quality of care, but do not use them 
because most independent practices are too small to afford the 
technology.246  Few emergency rooms have patient-protecting software 
because of limited resource pooling and economies of scale.247  Over and 
over again, one finds that providers fail to implement proven patient safety 
measures because they lack incentives to bear the cost.248
The absence of a business case for quality explains the infrequency 
of error reporting as well.  Outside the health care sector, many businesses 
have created non-punitive internal working environments that encourage 
workers to bring problems to light.249  They have taken this step, despite 
facing external liability threats, because the benefits of extremely low 
defect levels exceed the costs.  Health care providers can create non-
244
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punitive environments too, and the few hospitals that have done so have 
experienced “striking” increases in the frequency of error reports.250  The 
number of such providers is small, however, reflecting the fact that 
providers have little to gain.  Attempts to blame under-reporting on fears 
of litigation sound plausible, but the real problem is that the market forces 
operating in the health care sector create little pressure for quality to 
improve.
In theory, patients could exert pressure for quality by voting with 
their feet.  In fact, they have not done so.  Outside the health care sector, 
businesses that produce sub-par goods and services can expect to suffer 
near-death experiences that chasten their managers.  Inside the health care 
sector, it is the patients who suffer these experiences, not the providers.  
This may be because patients cannot easily differentiate between high 
quality care (and high quality providers) and low quality care (and low 
quality providers).  If patients can’t tell the difference, they can neither 
reward high quality providers by patronizing them, nor punish low quality 
providers by shunning them.  Even providers who recognize that they have 
a problem and want to invest in quality enhancement can reasonably 
anticipate that it will be all pain and no gain.
C. THE RARITY OF RESULT-BASED COMPENSATION 
The documented shortcomings in the health care sector result from 
what an economist would describe as a series of principal-agent 
problems.251  Doctors, nurses, and other health care providers are agents 
that patients engage to provide information and therapeutic services.  Yet, 
because delivery systems are complex and staffed by fallible human 
beings, the risk of inadequate performance is high, as is the risk of harm.  
Patients rationally want health care providers to use their superior 
knowledge to minimize these risks, but providers are not complying.
250
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Ordinarily, principals use two methods to encourage agents to 
perform well: monitoring and bonding.  Bonding involves efforts to tie the 
agent’s fate to the principal’s, so that self-interest will motivate the agent 
to serve the principal well.  Monitoring involves supervision of the agent 
by the principal.  
Agents operating in the health care sector go to great lengths to 
bond with patients.  Doctors and nurses receive extensive training, 
certifications, and continuing education.  They commit themselves to 
codes of ethics and subject themselves to perfectionist standards and peer 
review.  Hospitals operate on a non-profit basis, reducing the incentive to 
“cheat on quality.”  Providers place great weight on their reputations.  
In other industrial sectors, producers do similar things.  They 
demonstrate commitments to quality by developing brand names, by 
obtaining certifications from independent regulators, by agreeing to meet 
production deadlines or quotas, and by setting explicit quality standards 
and performance targets.  Producers operating outside the health care 
sector also take a further step: they tie their financial success to their 
customers’ satisfaction by offering warranties, money-back guarantees, 
inexpensive service contracts, and other emoluments.  In other words, they 
use compensation arrangements that reward them for meeting quality 
specifications and producing good results.  Producers do this for a simple 
reason: they gain by keeping their customers happy and allaying their 
customers’ fears.  A world in which disappointed or worried customers 
can take their business elsewhere is a world in which competition is a 
potent force for quality improvement.
Many service agents use result-based compensation arrangements 
(RBCAs) too.  Lawyers, salespersons, real estate agents, financial 
advisers, auctioneers, and company managers frequently condition their 
right to compensation in whole or in part on outcomes, e.g., dollars 
recovered for clients, sales volume, prices, returns on investments, 
revenues, or stock values.252  The linkage between payment and 
252 See Hyman & Silver, supra note * at ** (“Lawyers of diverse types work on 
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Revenue Service and local taxing authorities.  Investment bankers, stockbrokers, real 
estate agents, auctioneers, department store clerks, insurance agents, advertising agencies, 
political consultants, and telemarketers work on commission.  So do corporate officers, 
directors, and executives who receive stock options, partners who share in a firm’s 
profits, employees who receive bonuses, and service personnel who receive tips.  Even 
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performance brings the economic interests of principals and agents into 
closer alignment, to their mutual benefit.
Although RBCAs prevail throughout the economy, they are 
virtually unknown in the health care sector.253  Of the four most prevalent 
compensation arrangements—fee-for-service, flat rate, capitation, and 
salary—none ties the right to payment to service quality or patients’ 
health.  All four arrangements are quality-invariant and outcome-
independent.  Providers receive the same amount, whether or not they 
deliver high quality care.254  Doctors have even used the AMA’s Code of 
Medical Ethics to prohibit fee arrangements that link compensation to 
results.255
As a general matter, existing compensation arrangements pay 
health care providers for what they do, not for what they accomplish.256
This failure to tie compensation to variables that correlate strongly with 
patients’ needs and desires has a striking consequence: providers have no 
direct economic incentive to deliver high quality medical care.257  In many 
253 See R. Adams Dudley et al., The Impact of Financial Incentives on Quality of Health 
Care, 76 Milbank Q. 649, 654 (1998) ("Linking salaries and bonuses to performance on 
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practice has been rare until recently and has not been well studied.").  The Department of 
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mistakes.  See Pear, supra.
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instances, providers can actually profit by cutting quality at patients’ 
expense.258  As former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich cuttingly 
noted, “healthcare is the only industry in America that can give you a 
disease and then charge you to cure the disease it gave you.”259
Payers share responsibility for this state of affairs.  Payers have 
historically cared more about price than quality, so they have negotiated 
terms that largely delegate responsibility for quality to providers.  
Although payers have recently become more interested in performance-
based compensation arrangements, there are daunting institutional and 
political barriers to their adoption.260
Even so, RBCAs have the potential to create the business case for 
quality that is so often missing in the health care sector.  By forcing 
providers to internalize the costs of low quality care and enabling them 
capture the benefits of high quality care, RBCAs can spur improvements 
in the quality of goods and services.261
RBCAs also have an important information-forcing aspect.  As 
noted previously, many organizations have hostile internal cultures that 
discourage health care workers from reporting and dealing with mistakes.  
RBCAs can encourage these organizations to transform themselves by 
making their dysfunctional culture more expensive.  As soon as employers 
258
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bestow honors, recognition, and other rewards on employees who find 
weaknesses and cure them, good attitudes will take hold and flourish.262
The dearth of RBCAs may also explain why consumer ignorance is 
a persistent problem in the health care sector.  As stated, principals use 
two methods to obtain reliable performance from agents: bonding and 
monitoring.  Unfortunately, monitoring appears to have little impact on 
health care quality, mainly because patients have difficulty assessing the 
quality of care they receive.263  The information asymmetry is too great for 
patients to overcome.
Health care is far from the only industry in which producers know 
more about the quality of goods and services than consumers do.  Indeed, 
it is difficult to identify any economic sector in which this is not true.  Car 
companies know more about the reliability of automobiles than buyers do.  
Growers, grocers, and restaurateurs know more about the purity of foods 
than consumers do.  Commercial airlines know more about safety records, 
on-time arrival frequencies, and lost luggage problems than passengers do.  
Significant informational asymmetries between sellers and buyers are 
common.
Markets provide incentives to overcome these asymmetries.  Price 
and non-price competition creates pressures for sellers to make sure 
buyers know where high-quality goods and services can be found.  
Consider televisions.  If television sets vary in quality, manufacturers of 
better sets can profit by charging higher prices or selling more units.  For 
this strategy to work, consumers must be able to tell good sets from bad 
ones, something they cannot naturally do.  High-quality sellers have 
incentives to invest in the reputation of their brand name and educate 
customers.  Consumers quickly learn to avoid sellers that withhold 
information, or recognize that they are trading off price against quality in 
dealing with such sellers. 
By comparison to other producers, health care providers say little 
about the quality of the goods and services they provide.  They rarely 
convey information about mortality rates, infection rates, inoculation rates, 
wait times, or other matters of interest to patients.  They do not benchmark 
262
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themselves against other providers or advertise the results.264  They resist 
efforts by others to rank them.265  They do not even provide complete 
information about prices in advance.  Their silence reflects that the fact 
that educating patients has little upside for them.266  RBCAs invert this 
dynamic, and create incentives for providers to gather and disclose more 
data in order to attract patients and garner the associated economic 
rewards.  
D. ALTERNATIVES TO RBCAS
The “reforms” offered by proponents of the conventional wisdom 
also demonstrate the need for RBCAs and other sources of incentives to 
improve the quality of care.  Without exception, critics of liability call for 
extensive government financing and regulation of health care providers.267
264
 See Wruck & Jensen, supra, at p.   (“Many TQM organizations also benchmark, 
comparing their performance to data available on the performance of peer or competitor 
firms.”).
265
 Some first-party health insurers have recently begun to make provider rankings 
available to subscribers.  Predictably, providers have questioned the value of the rankings 
and their accuracy.  See Liz Kowalczyk, Online rankings rankle hospitals: Insurers 
offering data to consumers, The Boston Globe, March 8, 2004.
266
 Stuart M. Butler, A New Policy Framework For Health Care Markets, 23 Health 
Affairs 22, 23 (Apr. 2004) (arguing that health care plans offer more information to 
subscribers when forced to compete); Alain C. Enthoven, Market Forces and Efficient 
Health Care Systems, 23 Health Affairs 25, 25 (Apr. 2004) (contending that health care 
purchasers are poorly informed partly because providers “resist[] … the collection and 
publication of quality-related information”).  Jost, Ariz. L. Rev., supra at 850-855, 
emphasizes the severity of the information problems afflicting health care consumers.  
We agree that the project of educating patients is demanding and difficult, and we harbor 
no illusions of widespread intelligent service selection.  But widespread intelligent 
selection may not be needed.  In most markets, a good deal of free-riding occurs as 
unsophisticated shoppers benefit from the producers’ efforts to satisfy the demands of 
informed shoppers who seek out the best goods and services at the best prices.  Free-
riding could also occur in the health care sector if the population of sophisticated patients 
was larger.  Our point is only that it will become larger if providers are incentivized to 
convey more information.
267
 See, e.g., Kathleen Covert Kimmel and Joyce Sensmeier, A Technological Approach 
to Enhancing Patient Safety, 17 J. Healthc. Inf. Manag. (2003) (“Given the expense of an 
electronic medical record system, which includes physician order entry, medication 
administration records, and decision support systems, funding from the hospital 
supplemented by the federal government is needed. . . . .  [T]he government needs to 
create a national health information infrastructure as a medical communication highway 
to protect its citizens.”); Lapetina, supra, at    (recommending that governments require 
ambulatory and office-based surgical centers to require accreditations and to mandate the 
use of licensed anesthesiologists in certain procedures); id. (“[T]he U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) should mandate that all states create standard of care 
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Consider Professor Liang’s self-described “very modest proposal.”  He 
would “create a patient safety center within the National Institutes of 
Health for coordination and study of medical error,” “mandate systems-
based patient safety and error reduction efforts . . . as a condition of 
accreditation and licensure of institutional providers,” “mandate systems-
based, patient safety and error reduction, [and] continuing medication 
education for individual providers,” “mandate [error] reporting with the 
stick of licensure suspension or revocation for nonreporting,” “eliminate [] 
termination without cause clauses in physician contracts” with employing 
health care organizations, separate financial officers from clinicians, 
“mandate third party, independent review when physicians and health care 
plans conflict in recommendations for patients,” and, apparently, forcibly 
educate patients.268  That Liang describes his call for extensive 
governmental involvement as “a very modest proposal” shows only that 
no one expects providers to achieve appropriate safety levels on their 
own.269
The almost reflexive reliance of commentators on governmental 
initiatives is easy to understand.  Regulations more often drive major 
efforts to improve patient safety than market forces.  Interviews conducted 
as part of the Community Tracking Study confirm this.  When accounting 
for improvements, hospital administrators and other interviewees cited the 
desire to meet JCAHO accreditation requirements more often than other 
cause.270  They even gave JCAHO credit for improvements that were not 
tied to express JCAHO requirements, such as investments in electronic 
medical records and other forms of information technology.  These 
for office-based surgery and procedures involving anesthesia within a designated number 
of years.  The standards should address areas including patient monitoring during 
procedures, technology implementation, and equipment purchase and maintenance.”); 
Doolan & Bates, supra, at   (recommending state and federal grants for technology 
implementation); Liang, supra note, at 43-44 (stating that “managed care organizations . . 
. have no incentive to engage in or fund the significant administrative and clinical costs 
associated with error reduction research and implementation”); Bates and Gawande.
268
 Liang, supra note  , 24 S. Ill. U. L. J. at 561-566.  Liang also identifies need for 
“internal and industry-wide reporting and analysis systems that continuously monitor 
errors and error reduction effectiveness.” Id. at 563.  It is not clear from the text whether 
he would create these by mandate, too.
269
 They should have much less faith in the ability of governments to police health care 
quality.  Experience with state-run incident reporting systems and medical boards 
provides no basis for optimism on this score.  See, e.g., Leape, Reporting of Adverse 
Events, supra, at 1636 (discussing underfunding and general inactivity of state reporting 
systems) 
270
 See Kelly J. Devers, Hoangmai H. Pham, and Gig Liu, What Is Driving Hospitals’ 
Patient-Safety Efforts, 23 Health Affairs 103, 105 (Apr. 2004).
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investments were said to be indirect means of helping hospitals meet 
requirements  that were expressly listed.271
The consensus that government must lead the way is an 
unmistakable sign that providers’ incentives are inadequate.  No one 
expects taxpayers to underwrite quality improvements in computers sold 
by Dell or cars sold by General Motors.272  The public expects both 
companies (and the private sector more generally) to invest in quality 
because doing so is profitable.  By offering RBCAs, Dell, General Motors, 
and a host of other companies align their interests with those of their 
consumers.  It is time for health care providers to do the same – and once 
they do so, we should fully expect immediate and extensive improvement 
in the quality of care they provide.  
VIII. Harmonizing the Liability and Patient-Safety Approaches 
Patient safety advocates argue that faulty systems cause medical 
errors, not bad people.  But tort liability blames individuals (and 
sometimes entities) for mistakes and holds them accountable for patients’ 
losses.  This is one reason many patient safety advocates believe that tort 
liability is detrimental.  Because it shames and blames individuals, it is 
thought to apply pressure at the wrong points.
Yet, tort liability and patient safety are not completely 
incompatible.  One can find many anecdotal reports in which malpractice 
lawsuits caused providers to address systemic problems they neglected 
when left to their own devices.273  The history recounted in Part IV.B. 
shows that anesthesiologists revamped their systems and improved their 
performance because of tort liability, not in spite of it.  And the Harvard 
Medical Practice Study found that professional negligence and patient 
harm were less likely to occur when injured patients were more likely to 
sue.  The correct assessment appears to be that tort liability sometimes 
motivates providers to improve their performance and their delivery 
systems but does so inconsistently and less effectively than is optimal.  
271
 Id., at 107.
272
 To be sure, technology transfer of government-funded research is another matter 
entirely.  In general, the U.S. relies on a mix of public and private funding to conduct 
basic scientific research.  Applied research is more heavily funded by private parties, who 
reasonably anticipate garnering an economic return from their investments.  
273
 See, e.g., Michael J. Berens, Infection Epidemic Carves Deadly Path, Chicago 
Tribune, July, 21, 2002, www.chicagotribune.com/news/specials/chi-
0207210272/jul21.story (visited Feb. 5, 2004) (discussing efforts Bridgeport Hospital in 
Connecticut made to bring down rates of post-surgical nosocomial infections after a 
malpractice lawsuit brought the Hospital’s indifference in the face of a known peril to 
light).
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In this Part, we outline several ways of strengthening the tendency 
of tort liability to motivate providers to improve their delivery systems.  
We begin by setting out a simple theory of how tort liability is supposed to 
create incentives for quality improvement.  The theory forces one to re-
think the criticism that the tort system fails because it targets individuals 
instead of systems.  The criticism may be right, but not for the reason its 
authors contend.  We then examine the causes of the tort system’s failure 
to generate quality improvements.  Finally, we consider ways of 
strengthening the tort-based signal to improve.
A. CREATING INCENTIVES FOR SAFETY: A SIMPLE 
THEORY OF COST INTERNALIZATION
Organizations like hospitals and MCOs have the power to improve 
delivery systems, but tort law often holds individuals like doctors and 
nurses responsible for mistakes.  When individual providers “called the 
shots,” the decision to impose liability on them was arguably defensible.  
Now that organizations are in charge, it seems to makes no sense to hold 
individuals responsible for systems they do not control.274
The problem of individual accountability is compounded by 
MCOs’ efforts to influence the practice of medicine.  Physicians complain 
that MCOs prevent them from delivering medical care of the highest 
quality and punish them for advocating on behalf of patients.  It seems 
perverse to hold physicians liable for mishaps resulting from constraints 
MCOs impose on them.  Freeing MCOs from malpractice liability also 
weakens their incentive to improve quality.275  Enthusiasts of the 
conventional wisdom aggressively assert that these institutional realities 
support their criticisms of the tort system.  
Although these points are true in a superficial sense, liability critics 
who stress the choice of wrong targets fail to grapple with the Coasean 
point that contracts can cure inefficient assignments of liability.  If MCOs, 
health maintenance organizations (HMOs), hospitals, and other entities 
274
 Runciman & Tito, supra  at 975 (arguing against the application of sanctions to 
individuals and contending that “more attention should be given to demanding 
organizational compliance with appropriate standards”); Liang, supra note * at ** 
(“[L]iability rules on the organizational level may also impede error reduction activities . 
. . [because they] shield organizations from liability . . ., even though the organization has 
designed the incentive structure . . . .  This is a direct result of a physician’s independent 
contractor status; since the physician is not considered to be under the control of the 
organization and has significant discretion over the performance of his or her 
responsibilities, the organization, which “merely” pays for services, is generally not liable 
for the actions of the independent contract physician . . . .
275
 Liang, supra note, at 43-44 (“Further, because managed care organizations do not 
generally shoulder liability associated with patient injury, they have no incentive to 
engage in or fund the significant administrative and clinical costs associated with error 
reduction research and implementation.”)  
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can efficiently improve their systems, and if the law incorrectly imposes 
responsibility for mishaps on physicians, nothing impedes a contractual 
solution that minimizes expected error costs by shifting liability from 
physicians to organizations.
Consider an example.  Suppose that a doctor employed by an MCO 
can efficiently spend $1,000 reducing errors directly, that the doctor faces 
a remaining expected liability exposure of $25,000 per year after this 
investment is made, and that a liability insurance carrier would charge an 
actuarially fair premium of $25,000 to cover the remaining exposure.276
After preventing errors directly and buying insurance, the doctor’s total 
cost of dealing with errors is $26,000.
Now suppose the MCO could cut the doctor’s residual liability 
exposure from $25,000 to $5,000 by improving its health care delivery 
systems at a cost of $10,000.  Plainly, the doctor could save money by 
paying the MCO $10,000 to make the improvements and by paying a fair 
premium of $5,000 to insure the residual risk that would remain.  Paying 
the MCO to improve would reduce the doctor’s total cost of dealing with 
errors to $16,000 ($1,000 + $10,000 + $5,000).
The doctor’s professional liability carrier could accomplish the 
same result.  Continuing the preceding example, suppose the doctor is 
content to pay the $25,000 premium.  Instead of accepting the payment 
and shouldering the risk, the doctor’s liability carrier would find it 
advantageous to pay the MCO to improve its systems.  A $10,000 
payment to the MCO would save the carrier an expected $20,000 in 
liability costs, allowing it to pocket a $10,000 profit.277
Because a liability carrier can pool physicians who practice in the 
same hospital or facility, it may also find it advantageous to pay for 
improvements that individual physicians would not purchase on their own.  
Suppose a $50,000 improvement in a hospital’s operating room would 
276
 For simplicity, the example assumes that defense costs and claim adjustment expenses 
are zero and that liability insurance premiums are tailored to the risks individual 
physicians present.
277
 Liability insurers have in fact worked to reduce the frequency of malpractice claims.  
See, e.g., Office of Technology Assessment, Defensive Medicine and Medical 
Malpractice 33 (1994) (reporting that some malpractice insurers have developed 
“mandatory clinical protocols that physicians must follow to maintain coverage”); Liang, 
supra note **, 24. S. Ill. U. L. J. at 546-547 (reporting that malpractice carriers require 
doctors and hospitals to engage in risk management activities as a condition for obtaining 
coverage); Jack Moyers, Does Monitoring Have An Effect on Patient Safety?, 4 J. Clin. 
Mon. 110 (1988) (“We now find certain monitors being used [in connection with 
anesthesia] because insurance companies, either directly or indirectly, has issued a sort of 
ultimatum.”).
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reduce the liability exposure of 100 doctors by $1000 each.278  It would be 
irrational for any doctor to pay $50,000 for a $1000 gain, but it would be 
advantageous for a carrier covering all 100 doctors to pay $50,000 to save 
$100,000.  The liability insurer could thus achieve economies of scale that 
doctors not formally associated with each other might have difficulty 
obtaining on their own.
Completing the triangle, the MCO could step between the doctor 
and the liability insurer.  By agreeing to indemnify the doctor for 
malpractice claims, the MCO could absorb the doctor’s $25,000 expected 
liability loss in return for a payment of $25,000, spend $10,000 improving 
its systems, pay $5,000 for an insurance policy covering the doctor’s 
residual exposure, and pocket $10,000 in cash.279  An MCO could also 
perform an aggregating function by implementing practice standards and 
other safety enhancements and taxing their costs to all doctors under 
contract.280  Examples of such enterprise liability by contract exist in some 
areas of the health care marketplace, although there are clearly 
transactional and institutional barriers to its universal adoption.281
To summarize, if health care organizations could efficiently reduce 
error rates by improving delivery systems, the assignment of tort liability 
to individual providers should not impede progress.  It should instead 
create a bargaining environment in which physicians pay organizations 
directly or indirectly to make cost-justified improvements.282  The decision 
to saddle individuals with financial responsibility for mishaps should not 
be crucial, even if organizations have greater ability to improve health care 
delivery systems than they do.
Critics of tort liability nonetheless believe that the decision to 
target individuals is an important mistake.  If they are right, it can only be 
because contractual exchanges are not reassigning liability efficiently.  
The difficulty of contracting cannot account for this.  Doctors, hospitals, 
MCOs, and health care payers already use contracts to regulate many 
278
 Many safety devices that could be adopted at hospitals and other locations where 
doctors practice are likely to fit this description.  For example, all clinicians who 
prescribe medications in a hospital would benefit from a computerized drug order entry 
system.  Nurses and the hospital’s pharmacist would benefit too.  
279
 See Danzon, supra note **, at 1378 (“If enterprise liability is potentially efficient, it 
could already be adopted by voluntary contract between hospitals and their medical 
staff.”). 
280
 See Liang, supra note **, 17 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. at 57 (stating that a physician who 
contracts with an MCO “subjects himself or herself … to practice and other MCO 
requirements, including the use of specific clinical practice guidelines, limitations on care 
decisions by management, standards of utilization review,” and other terms). 
281 William M. Sage and James M. Jorling, A World That Won’t Stand Still: Enterprise 
Liability by Private Contract, 43 DePaul L. Rev. 1007, 1032 (1994).
282 Cf Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (1964) (noting importance of placing 
liability on cheapest cost avoider, regardless of whether they are parties to the contract).  
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aspects of health care delivery, and they have considerable freedom to 
reallocate malpractice risks.  Patricia Danzon, a leading health economist, 
points out that “contract enterprise liability is already the norm in at least 
one staff model HMO, in most teaching hospitals and in other contexts 
where physicians are salaried hospital employees.”283  Recent premium 
spikes appear to have encouraged risk-shifting as well, with “physicians in 
many states []seeking coverage from the hospitals with which they are 
affiliated.”284
To explain why the decision to target individuals makes a 
difference (assuming it does), one must posit defective incentives.  That is, 
one must show that inefficient assignments of liability “stick” because the 
incentives to shift responsibilities to organizations are missing even 
though organizations can bear them more efficiently.  The next section 
shows that defective private incentives may often arise.
B DEFECTIVE INCENTIVES IMPEDE LIABILITY 
TRADES
It should be plain by now that many providers invest fewer 
resources in patient safety than they should.  The most important 
explanation for this is the failure of the health care market to reward 
quality improvements.  Another is the tort system’s failure to pick up the 
slack.  The tort system emits a weak and inconsistent signal for quality 
improvement.285
The basic reason for this problem is that injured patients rarely sue.  
Focusing on hospitalized patients in New York, the HMPS found a 7.5 to 
283
 See Danzon, supra note **, at 1378. See also Liang, supra note **, 17 Yale L. & Pol’y 
Rev. at 57 (stating that a physician who contracts with an MCO “subjects himself or
herself … to practice and other MCO requirements, including the use of specific clinical 
practice guidelines, limitations on care decisions by management, standards of utilization 
review,” and other terms).
284
 William H. Sage, Medical Liability and Patient Safety, supra, at XX.
285
 The discussion in this section focuses on the tort system’s impact on errors that injure 
patients.  Other defects in health care delivery abound but are not generally subjects of 
tort litigation.  Consider waste.  Many medical tests and procedures, such as arthroscopic 
knee surgery for patients with osteoarthritis and spinal fusion surgery for patients with 
back pain, are of doubtful effectiveness.  Jensen & Tinker, supra, at 15-16 (“The truth is 
that many currently ‘standard’ diagnostic and therapeutic practices, involving huge 
numbers of patients, high risks, and tremendous costs, rest upon very uncertain 
foundations with respect to efficacy.”).  Ineffective procedures do not trigger malpractice 
lawsuits unless they are delivered improperly and patients are harmed.  Consequently, 
malpractice lawsuits are not means of discouraging waste.  On the effectiveness of knee 
surgery and spinal fusion surgery, see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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1 ratio between negligence-induced adverse events286 and the total number 
of medical malpractice claims.287  Approximately 2% of patients whose 
injuries stem from negligence file claims, although claiming is more 
common when injuries are severe.288  “Even when the injury sample [was] 
narrowed to a subset of more monetarily valuable tort claims—those 
involving serious injury to patients less than seventy years old—a 
negligence-to-claims ratio of 5 to 2 persist[ed].”289  Other studies also find 
low claim rates.290
The universe of filed lawsuits also contains a substantial number of 
claims, perhaps even a majority, in which no negligence occurred.  In 
many instances, there was not even an adverse event.  Over-claiming—the 
assertion of invalid malpractice claims—is, however, dwarfed by under-
claiming—the failure to assert valid claims.  “[F]or every doctor or 
hospital against whom an invalid claim is filed, there are seven valid 
claims that go un-filed.”291
Because under-claiming is so widespread, the tort system 
predictably fails to send a strong quality-improvement signal.292  To create 
optimal incentives, the system would have to transfer 100 percent of the 
costs of negligence from patients to providers.  In fact, patients and their 
first-party health insurers bear the vast majority of the costs of medical 
286
 An adverse event is an injury caused by medical management (rather than the 
underlying disease process) that resulted in either a prolonged hospital stay or disability 
at discharge.  The judgment that an adverse event had occurred was based on a two-stage 
process using implicit standards to conduct a professional review of the medical records.  
The studies of New York (1984 hospitalizations) resulted in an adverse event rate of 
3.7%.  Subsequent studies of Utah and Colorado (1992 hospitalizations) resulted in an 
adverse event rate of 2.9% in those states.   
287
 Studdert et al., supra, at p. 7 (reporting that “[i]n total, approximately 3,600 
malpractice claims relating to injury year 1984 were made in New York.  A comparison 
to the 27,000 negligent adverse events arising in that year produces a negligence-to-
claims ratio of 7.5 to 1.”)
288
 Studdert et al., supra, at p. 7.  
289
 Paul C. Weiler et al., A Measure of Malpractice, supra, at 70 (noting that “nearly 80 
percent (10,026 out of 12,859) of the patients who suffered a negligent injury but did not 
sue were either fully recovered from the injury within six months or were more than 70 
years old when the injury occurred.”); Danzon, supra, at 1354 (explaining that 
malpractice lawsuits rarely occur when patients suffer small injuries).
290
 See also Danzon, supra, at 1354-57 (reviewing studies showing that patients injured 
by medical negligence rarely sue).  
291
 Saks, supra note **, at 703.  
292
 Mello & Brennan, supra, at 1623.  See also F. Sloan et al. (page); Weiler et al., A 
Measure of Malpractice, supra, at 112 (“To the extent that injured victims systematically 
underutilize their tort rights, there is a corresponding reduction in actors’ incentives to 
adopt socially optimal precautions against such injuries.”).  
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injuries.293  The fraction of the cost borne by providers is far too small to 
motivate them to invest as heavily as they should in quality 
improvements.294
Even if the tort process had no other defects, under-claiming would 
eliminate private incentives to make many socially efficient 
improvements.  Suppose an MCO could cut the expected costs of 
negligently inflicted iatrogenic injuries to patients from $25,000 to $5,000 
by investing $7,500 in better health care delivery systems.  From an 
efficiency perspective, the investment, which saves $12,500 in net 
expected injury-related costs, ought to be made.  If tort law holds 
physicians responsible for negligence, not MCOs, then the MCO will have 
no incentive to spend the $7,500 barring the Coasean transactions outlined 
previously.  Without those transactions, the MCO would bear the cost of 
the improvement, but others—patients and doctors—will reap the gains.  
Nor, in a world of widespread under-claiming, would doctors find it 
economically advantageous to pay the MCO to make the improvement.  
Suppose that patients bearing only 13 percent of the injuries sue, the 
percentage indicated by a 7.5 to 1 ratio of adverse events to claims.  It 
would cost doctors $3,250 to compensate these plaintiffs in full, far less 
than the $7,500 the improvement would require.  
Under-claiming makes it cheaper for providers to tolerate problems 
than to fix them.295  Unless settlements and verdicts are “up-weighted” to 
reflect this fact – and they are not – providers will necessarily be under-
deterred by the tort system.296  Providers will also lack incentives to 
reallocate malpractice risks efficiently in many situations.
293
 See Randall R. Bovbjerg and Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory 
and Evidence, 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 53, 60-61 (1998) (“the vast majority of medical injuries 
are reimbursed by the first-party coverages, just as are the underlying conditions that 
caused patients to seek medical care initially”) (citing Deborah R. Hensler et al., 
Compensation for Accidental Injuries in the United States (1991)).
294
 Poor quality health care of all forms was said to account for roughly $420 billion in 
direct medical spending in 2003 and for another $105 to $210 billion in indirect costs, 
like reduced business productivity due to employee absenteeism.  The total economic 
burden imposed by poor quality health care is thus in the neighborhood of $500 to $700 
billion.  Midwest Business Group on Health, Reducing the Costs of Poor-Quality Health 
Care Through Responsible Purchasing Leadership i (2nd printing, Apr. 2003).  By 
comparison, providers spent about $21 billion on malpractice insurance in 2001.  
Insurance Information Institute, Medical Malpractice (Sept. 2003), 
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/medicalmal/.
295
 Under-claiming may be less troubling when punitive damages are available for certain 
claims that are brought directly against MCOs.  
296
 Hyman, supra note * at **.  Professor Saks suggests that this “up-weighting” function 
is being accomplished indirectly, by terrorizing physicians more generally about the 
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Some commentators who assert that malpractice liability impedes 
progress by driving errors underground also believe that under-claiming 
weakens providers’ incentives to invest in patient safety.297  The 
combination of views is odd.  Logically, those who espouse the 
conventional wisdom should argue that the rarity of malpractice suits 
improves health care quality by reducing the frequency and severity of 
punishments.  If all malpractice victims were to file lawsuits and obtain 
compensation, the conventional wisdom would predict a marked decline in 
health care quality, as proliferating lawsuits scared providers out of their
wits and fostered unprecedented efforts to hide mistakes.  One cannot have 
it both ways.  Either tort deters (in which case more is better) or it doesn’t 
(in which case less is better).  Regardless, there is, once again, little 
empirical evidence to support the conventional wisdom.
Other problems further dilute the tort system’s deterrent signal.  
After patients file malpractice cases, the system does a reasonably good 
job of sorting the wheat from the chaff -- a much better job than many 
proponents of tort reform suggest.  Many studies report high frequencies 
of settlement and payment in cases where experts agree that defendants 
violated the standard of care and low frequencies when experts agree 
otherwise.298  Still, a good job is not a perfect one.  Civil justice processes 
produce wrong decisions with some frequency, awarding damages to 
undeserving claimants and withholding damages when negligence and 
injury occurred.299  Many of these mistakes are inevitable.  Malpractice 
consequences of falling into the clutches of the tort system.  See Saks, supra note *, at 
1286-87.  Professor Saks does not consider the demoralization costs associated with this 
strategy, or the anti-tort coalition strategies it encourages.
297
 See, e.g., Liang, supra note ** at 567 (arguing that because “fewer than one out of 
sixteen patients who are ‘negligently’ injured ever collect a penny from the tort system 
…[,] we’re not getting the appropriate effect in terms of maximization of safety and 
minimization of error and . . . injury.”).
298
 Catherine T. Harris, et al., Placing “Standard of Care” in Context: The Impact of 
Witness Potential and Attorney Reputation in Medical Malpractice Litigation 4 (2002) 
(“Over the past fifteen years, there have been a number of empirical studies of the 
medical malpractice claims process.  Virtually every one … has concluded that 
compensation paid to the plaintiff is closely related to a determination of ‘negligence,’ 
typically defined in terms of a failure by the defendant physician to meet the relevant 
standard of care.”); F.A. Sloan et al, Suing for Malpractice, supra, Chapter  8.; Ralph 
Peeples et al., The Process of Managing Medical Malpractice Cases: the Role of 
Standard of Care, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 877, 885-886 (2002) (reporting that “[i]n 
100% … of the cases in which the outside reviewers evaluated the defendant-physician as 
probably liable, the insurer concluded that the standard of care had been breached,” and 
that “money was paid to the plaintiff in 93.1% of the cases” in which the insurer 
determined that the standard of case was breached). 
299
 See, e.g., Cheney et al. (reporting payments in *% of anesthesia-related cases where 
reviewing physicians found no negligence).  Physicians who are sued when they are not 
negligent incur significant financial and reputational costs.  
Malpractice Liability and Health Care Quality 77
cases are so complex and subjective that even experts disagree over 
correct outcomes an appreciable part of the time.300  Standards of care are 
often uncertain as well because evidence of the efficaciousness of 
treatments is lacking.  Payments are therefore often made or withheld in 
many tort cases where educated people could reasonably criticize either 
result.  As Sloan et al. observe, “[t]o the extent that there is highly 
incomplete knowledge about the effect of particular interventions by 
health care providers on outcomes, it is unrealistic to expect courts to be 
omniscient in this regard.”301
Civil justice processes also frequently over-compensate claimants 
with modest injuries and under-compensate claimants whose injuries are 
severe.  The degree of under-compensation varies directly with the
magnitude of injury, meaning that patients who suffer the worst harms 
also endure the most serious compensation shortfalls.302  Under-
compensation remains a problem even after payments from collateral 
sources are considered.303
These errors add a good deal of “noise” to the signal the tort 
system emits.304  The noisier the signal, the less effective it is in 
communicating a deterrent signal to health care providers.  If providers 
perceive they are likely to be held liable for non-negligent care, they are 
unlikely to take seriously the “outputs” of the tort system as indicative of 
anything.  
A further difficulty is that the tort system has very high loading 
costs.  For every dollar that reaches an injured patient as a result of a tort 
claim, almost two dollars are spent getting it there.  The magnitude of the 
expense is not surprising.  Malpractice lawsuits involve complex issues, 
expert witnesses, large damages, and, often, multiple defendants.  By 
comparison to other tort suits, they also last a long time.  All these factors 
300
 See, e.g., Peeples et al., supra, at 884 (reporting that in 34.3% of the cases in which a 
malpractice carrier solicited external reviews, the reviewers disagreed); 
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 F. Sloan et al, Suing for Medical Malpractice, supra, at 219.
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 F. Sloan et al, Suing for Medical Malpractice, supra, at 220 (“claimants tended to be 
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severe injuries and for deaths, in particular for infants”).
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  A team of Harvard researchers described the system as “sending as confusing a signal 
as would our traffic laws if the police regularly gave out more tickets to drivers who go 
through green lights than to those who go through red lights.”  Measure of Malpractice, 
supra note **, at 75.  To be sure, there is a substantial “base rate” problem with this 
metaphor.  Because the vast majority of drivers don’t go through red lights, even a small 
error rate in writing tickets will result in precisely this outcome.  See Saks, supra note **, 
at 714.  
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tend to increase litigation costs.305  Malpractice lawsuits also affect health 
care providers’ reputations and endanger their licenses.  Consequently, 
malpractice cases tend to be hard fought, even when liability is fairly 
clear.306
In theory, high litigation costs could have mixed effects.  They 
could weaken the tort system’s signal for quality by discouraging 
plaintiffs’ lawyers from bringing cases into the system.  They could also 
strengthen the signal by making errors that do reach the system more 
expensive to defend.  Although good empirical evidence is lacking, the 
first effect seems to outweigh the second.  Litigation costs have exerted 
little pressure to improve because, historically, insurance carriers, 
hospitals, and physicians have passed these costs onto patients and the 
public by charging higher premiums and fees.307
Finally, one must consider the impact malpractice insurance has on 
providers’ incentives.  Malpractice insurance for health care professionals 
is rarely risk-rated.308  Premiums vary by specialty, geography, and a few 
other variables, but they do not reflect individual providers’ loss 
experiences.  The failure to risk-rate insurance may well be rational, but it 
further limits the ability of the tort system to send a deterrent signal to 
physicians about the consequences of their actions – let alone the 
implications of their failing to adequately invest in patient safety 
measures.309
The problems discussed to this point—under-claiming, erroneous 
denials of compensation, under-compensation of patients with severe 
injuries, high litigation costs, and distortions attributable to malpractice 
305
 See Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 2073 (2002).
306
 See Peeples et al., Who Are Those Guys? (finding that insurers routinely made 
plaintiffs demonstrate the merit of their cases even when insurers’ thought liability was 
clear).
307 See Patricia M. Danzon, Mark V. Pauly & R. S. Kington, The Effects of Malpractice 
Litigation on Physicians’ Fees and Incomes, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 122, 125 (1990).  
William Sage argues that providers have found it harder to pass on premium increases in 
recent years.  William M. Sage, Medical Liability and Patient Safety, 22 Health Affairs 
26, 29 (Aug. 2003).  If Sage is right, one should see a variety of reactions as providers 
seek to lower their costs, including marginal improvements in health care safety resulting 
from increased implementation of efficient patient protections.  
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 Previous attempts to impose experience rating have been unsuccessful, as physicians 
have simply switched to insurers offering non-experience rated coverage.  See Frank A. 
Sloan, Experience Rating: Does it make sense for medical malpractice insurance?,  80 
Am. Econ. Rev. 128 (1990).  On experience rating for medical malpractice coverage 
more generally, see Gary M. Fournier & Melanie M. McInnes, The Case For Experience 
Rating in Medical Malpractice Insurance: An Empirical Investigation, 68 J. Risk & 
Insur. (2001)
309 But see Hyman, supra note * at ** (noting rise of risk-rated malpractice insurance in 
Texas.
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insurance—would limit the effectiveness of tort law even if civil justice 
processes made full compensation available to all negligently injured 
patients.  In fact, civil justice processes are not so generous.  Waves of tort 
reform have made it harder for patients with valid claims to obtain 
compensation and have limited the amounts they can recover.
Tort reform has taken a variety of forms.  The most prevalent type 
is a cap on non-economic damages (pain and suffering), which is usually 
not indexed for inflation.  Other proposals include screening panels, 
mandatory ADR, caps on contingent fees, collateral source offsets, 
requirements relating to expert reports and expert witnesses, and the like.  
In general, tort reforms make malpractice cases more expensive, riskier, 
and less rewarding for claimants and their lawyers, e.g. by requiring expert 
reports as a condition for filing claims, by capping damages or fees, or by 
making claimants endure additional burdens like screening panels or ADR 
processes before going to trial.  They also make malpractice claims less 
expensive for defendants by reducing their frequency, by weakening 
plaintiffs’ bargaining positions, by decreasing the willingness of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to bear costs, or by giving defendants credit for payments 
claimants receive from other sources.
For deterrence purposes, the impacts of tort reform on both sides 
matter.  On the claimant’s side, it is well known that economic incentives 
influence the behavior of plaintiff’s lawyers.  Because these lawyers work 
for contingent fees and have to bear large expenses, they prefer cases 
involving serious injuries, large damages, and clear liability.310  Patients 
have trouble finding representation when their injuries are small or their 
damages are small, which, in the case of the elderly and the poor, may be 
true even when injuries are severe.  Patients also find it hard to hire 
lawyers when it is unclear whether their treatment violated the standard of 
care.  Empirical studies have found that plaintiffs’ attorneys who handle 
malpractice cases are highly selective.311
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 Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to file Medical Malpractice 
Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1359 (1992) (“Unless claims are 
large enough, plaintiffs’ lawyers, paid by contingency fees, will not think them worth the 
effort.”).
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 See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Holding Back the Floodtide: The Role of Contingent Fee 
Lawyers, Wis. Law., Mar. 1997, at 10, 63; Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers 
As Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice System, 81 Judicature 22, 24 (1997).  See also Henry 
S. Faber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the 
Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. Econ. 199, 200 (1991) (arguing "[t]he contingency fee 
system gives plaintiffs' lawyers a strong incentive to screen prospective plaintiffs and to 
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By making cases riskier and less rewarding, tort reforms 
discourage contingent fee lawyers from taking cases.  For this reason, tort 
reforms reduce the incentive for providers to invest in measures that 
protect patients from harm and exercise due care in their treatments.  Tort 
reforms that make malpractice cheaper for defendants by reducing the 
frequency of lawsuits or the amounts defendants must pay to resolve them 
have the same economic effect.  
C. MAKING THE TORT SYSTEM WORK BETTER
Medical providers want to abolish the tort system.  Trial lawyers 
want to keep it.  Neither side is likely to win a complete victory.  Policy 
debate should therefore focus on accommodations that further the 
legitimate interests of both and that, above all, encourage improvements 
that protect patients from preventable harms.  We discuss certain 
possibilities here.
All of these proposals are necessarily quite preliminary, and they 
are likely to require modification in light of market developments and 
difficulties with implementation.  Yet all have the singular virtue of 
creating incentives for providers to “do the right thing,” by encouraging 
error reporting and the use of those reports to actually address the problem 
of low quality care.
1. Make the Market Work Better
As explained above, strong economic forces provide the overriding 
impetus for quality improvement in most industrial sectors.  The simple 
fact that producers profit by meeting customers’ needs creates enormous 
pressure to treat customers well.
When markets work well, civil justice systems can safely play a 
minor role in quality improvement.  Their main purpose can be to ensure a 
degree of civility and respect in economic relationships by taking the 
roughest edges off disagreements that buyers and sellers cannot work out 
on their own.312
In the health care sector, market forces subject providers to little 
economic pressure to improve.  Consequently, quality problems abound 
and courts are asked to exert greater pressure for quality than they 
normally do.  Even in theory, it is difficult for courts to play so large a 
role.  Markets cause quality to improve automatically by encouraging 
producers to generate new knowledge and changing their processes as 
312
 A distinguishing feature of highly developed capitalist economies is an ethic of 
honesty and fair dealing between buyers and sellers.  There is reason to think courts 
contribute to the development and persistence of this ethic.  Comparative studies show a 
positive correlation between economic growth and easy access by businesses to honest 
courts.  See Frank Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 Tex. L. Rev. (2002).
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knowledge grows.  Courts decide malpractice cases on the basis of old 
knowledge (that may or may not be reliable) that has been incorporated 
into a standard of care (that may or may not be efficient).  Courts are 
therefore inherently limited in what they can do.
The first prescription for improving health care quality must 
therefore be to increase the strength of market forces.  The highest priority 
should be given to arrangements that enhance providers’ incentives by 
tying their compensation to measurable improvements in outcomes and 
that enable patients to distinguish between superior and inferior providers 
effectively.313  To restore the ex post tort system to its proper role, we 
should place more emphasis on ex ante contracts between payers, patients, 
and providers.  
2. Allow Premiums for Malpractice Insurance to 
Rise
The history of anesthesia safety suggests that providers react in 
economically rational ways to changes in premiums for malpractice 
insurance.  Anesthesiologists studied their delivery systems and improved 
them because it saved them money overall.  At the time, anesthesiologists’ 
insurance premiums were considerably higher than those paid by many 
other physicians.  By reducing morbidity and mortality rates, 
anesthesiologists protected millions of patients from avoidable harms, cut 
the number of malpractice complaints, and saved money on insurance.
Anesthesiology is the only medical practice area to achieve 
reliability rates that rival those of high quality producers in other 
industries.  The persons most responsible for its improvement openly 
admit that lowering malpractice premiums was an important objective.  
The lesson for policy makers is that rising insurance rates can encourage 
health care providers to make desirable improvements.  The lesson is also 
that litigation rates and premiums will fall on their own when providers 
improve the quality of care.
Policy makers should therefore resist the urge to rescue providers 
from premium increases by capping damages or otherwise impeding the 
tort system’s ability to shift the costs of malpractice from patients to 
providers.  By doing nothing, policy makers may achieve significant 
results in a short time.314 Anesthesia safety improved dramatically and 
quickly after the ASA promulgated guidelines for patient monitoring.  
Insurers reduced premiums for anesthesiologists soon thereafter, as their 
313 See Hyman & Silver, supra note * at **.  
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performance improved.  If policy makers had intervened, e.g., by capping 
malpractice premiums for anesthesiologists or limiting their liability to 
patients, the incentive to address the underlying quality problems would 
have diminished. 
The improvements anesthesiologists implemented in the 1980s 
have had staying power.  Unlike rates for other medical professionals, 
anesthesiologists’ insurance premiums have remained relatively flat, 
reflecting the fact that anesthesia delivery continues to be safe.  A 
plausible hypothesis is that the pro-quality attitudes and institutions 
anesthesiologists created took hold, fostering a culture of safety with a life 
of its own.  If policy makers allow insurance rates to rise for other 
providers, they will feel pressure to develop similar attitudes and 
institutions, and the culture of medicine may forever be changed.
3. Use Caps on Non-Economic Damages to Reward 
Error Reporting and Error Reduction
To encourage voluntary error reporting, an obvious strategy is to 
reward providers for making reports and punish them for hiding mistakes.  
We propose that a cap on non-economic damages be used for this purpose.  
Although many states have imposed such caps already, they have not used 
them as we propose because their object was to limit insurance costs, not 
to improve health care quality.  States with caps thus missed an 
opportunity to encourage providers to make improvements that would 
protect patients and cause insurance costs to decline naturally.
When a provider reports an error within a specified time of its 
occurrence, we proposed that the provider receive the protection of a limit 
on non-economic damages.  The limit could take many forms, e.g., a flat 
cap, a sliding scale tied to the amount of economic damages awarded, or a 
percentage reduction against an eventual trial award.  When a provider 
fails to report an error in a timely manner, we propose that non-economic 
damages be enhanced.  Again, many arrangements are possible.  A floor 
could be set, a trial verdict could have a multiplier applied, etc.
Using a combination of carrots and sticks should increase error 
reporting greatly.  Today, health care workers who know about errors 
rarely have incentives to report them because error reduction benefits 
neither their employers nor them.  The possibility of reducing damage 
awards to injured patients would pressure providers to reward workers for 
conveying useful information.  Because providers with functioning error-
reporting systems would also face less liability, insurance companies 
could also offer them lower premiums.  Insurers might even make the 
existence of error-reporting practices a condition for extending coverage.
The rewards and punishments we propose could have collateral 
benefits as well.  First, by reporting errors and gaining the benefit of the 
cap, providers would reduce the variance associated with malpractice 
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claims.  This should make malpractice cases easier to settle and to insure.  
The floor on non-economic damages should reduce the variance as well.  
Second, because the fact of having made a report would have to be public 
(at least to the extent of being revealed to the trial court), information 
about providers’ error reporting practices would be produced.  Employers, 
consumer groups, and others could use this information when rating 
providers or deciding whether to include them in networks.
The possibility of rewarding providers for reporting errors raises 
two important questions: what should they report and to whom?  There are 
many options.  Choices among them should be made on the basis of their 
tendency to promote quality improvement.  
An option that seems especially attractive would be to require 
providers to participate in quality surveys like those run by The Leapfrog 
Group.  Providers of lesser quality tend to withdraw from these surveys in 
disproportionate numbers.  Yet, if malpractice claims track the frequency 
of errors, these providers also stand to gain the most from damages caps.  
Consequently, the incentive for them to participate in quality surveys 
would increase dramatically.
Tying the damages cap to participation in third party surveys 
would also create the option of rewarding providers for improving their 
quality survey “scores” over time.  This could be accomplished by 
creating a second cap (and lower) cap on non-economic damages that 
becomes available when measurable improvements in quality targets are 
achieved.
Rewarding providers for improving their quality survey “scores” 
would also address a second problem.  Error reporting is a necessary 
condition for improvement but not a sufficient one.  Providers have known 
all along about some of the problems outlined in this article, but many 
have not put their knowledge to use because they find it cheaper and easier 
to allow errors to occur than to prevent them.  To harmonize medical 
liability and patient safety, it is as critical to create incentives to use 
knowledge appropriately as to reward providers for accumulating 
information.
4. Reward Health Care Workers for Reporting 
Problems
Under-claiming, which weakens the deterrent signal sent by the 
tort system, is inherently difficult to fix.  Although one often hears that 
Americans are excessively litigious, most of us are exceedingly reluctant 
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to sue.315  Most of us also cannot easily tell whether we received proper 
care.  Finally, most injuries stemming from medical errors also are too 
small to justify the high cost of malpractice litigation.  The tendency of 
first-party health care payers to share these costs also waters down 
patients’ incentives.  The prospects for increasing the claim rate are dim.
Given this difficulty, one must consider the possibility of allowing 
people other than patients to sue.  Health care workers are the obvious 
candidates.  They are more likely than patients to know about errors and 
faulty delivery systems.  They may also know when health care providers 
are ignoring shortcomings instead of correcting them.  Finally, they may 
be professionally motivated or obligated to protect patients.
Health care workers lack standing to file malpractice suits.  They 
can complain to regulators, however, but they are not rewarded for doing 
so.316  Consequently, it is more profitable for them to participate in the 
“conspiracy of silence” that allows errors to continue than to report them.  
A qui tam approach, loosely based on that found in the False 
Claims Act (FCA),317 could create substantial incentives for employees to 
come forward.  The approach we envision would reward workers for 
reporting problems to administrative agencies or third party quality 
monitors by paying them liquidated bonuses.  The reports would be 
confidential, to ameliorate employees’ fear of reprisal.  Providers that, 
upon investigation, are found to have sub-par systems in place would be 
penalized.  These penalties would fund the reporting employees’ rewards.  
Because the penalties would be fines rather than civil damages, they 
would not be covered by insurance.
Small bonuses would probably generate significant information 
about seriously deficient health care providers without giving employees 
incentives to abuse the process, e.g., by lodging complaints after being 
discharged.  If proponents of the conventional wisdom are right, many 
health care workers are looking for safe ways to reveal errors and pressure 
their employers to improve.  These employees may fear reprisal on the job 
as much as or more than they fear litigation.  The approach we envision 
315
 International comparisons reveal that on a per capita basis Americans are less likely to 
sue than Germans, Swedes, Israelis, and Austrians, and about as likely to sue as Britons 
and Danes.  See Herbert M. Kritzer, 80 Tex. L. Rev. xxx (2002) (reprinting figure 
comparing per capita litigation rates in diverse countries).
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would give employees with valuable information an opportunity to reveal 
it without putting their jobs on the line.
Again, the questions of what to report and to whom must be 
addressed.  It probably makes more sense to rely on independent quality 
monitors than on public agencies like state medical boards.  The latter 
have proven to be incapable of policing quality effectively.  The entities 
that are leading the campaign for quality are the ones most likely to resist 
being captured by providers and to give complaints the attention they 
deserve.318
A complementary approach that would also use a qui tam strategy 
would allow employees to bring malpractice cases on behalf of patients.  
The statute of limitations on such cases should only start running after the 
individual plaintiff has had a reasonable amount of time to bring a case on 
his own behalf.  One could also allow employees to file qui tam cases 
immediately and for liquidated damage amounts when injuries are too 
small to justify contingent fee lawsuits, as frequently is true.  All of these 
strategies have the potential to address the under-claiming that makes 
malpractice cheaper for providers than it should be.  
5. Recognize Evidence-Based Medicine as an 
Absolute Defense 
Physicians complain bitterly that their conduct is subject to 
second-guessing by know-nothing juries and judges.  To the extent 
physicians render care that meets consensus standards of quality, there is 
no reason to subject them to liability or to devote legal resources to such 
cases.  Although there are obvious difficulties associated with the 
development of consensus standards, physicians who adhere to those 
standards should be immune from suit.319  As noted previously, physicians 
express fear and loathing about the prospect of being sued.  If physicians 
fear malpractice as much as they say they do, the prospect of immunity 
should be an immediate incentive for the implementation of these 
standards.    
318
 See Kelly J. Devers, Hoangmai H. Pham, and Gig Liu, What Is Driving Hospitals’ 
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6. Require Repeat Defendants to Undergo Quality 
Audits and Publicize the Results 
A relatively small fraction of all physicians account for a 
disproportionate share of malpractice claims, settlements, and judgments.  
Targeting reform efforts against those who are most responsible for the 
problem is an efficient use of limited resources.  Rather than wait for 
malpractice claims to be brought, state licensing boards and the hospitals 
at which repeat defendants have privileges should be required to conduct 
prospective quality audits and publicize the results of those audits.  Even if 
the audits do not result in any disciplinary action or limitation of 
privileges, the act of publicizing the quality audits should alone create 
considerable incentives for repeat defendant physicians to correct their 
deficiencies or find another line of work.  
VIII. Conclusion
Patient safety advocates have made strong and unqualified claims 
about the deleterious impact of medical liability on the performance of the 
health care system.  Although their claims are plausible, the best available 
evidence does not support them.  Liability appears to make a modest 
positive contribution to patient safety overall, accounts for significant 
improvements in anesthesia safety, encourages providers to solve specific 
problems at specific health care institutions, and causes physicians to be 
more forthcoming in conversations with patients.320
Many providers have failed to adopt patient safety measures of 
proven effectiveness, and they have similarly failed to use information 
already in their possession to protect patients from harm.321  Given that 
320Millenson, The Silence, supra, at 108.  See also Danzon, supra, at 1362 (“[C]asual 
evidence indicates that hospital and other peer review procedures have been strengthened 
in direct response to liability.”); Millenson, The Patient’s View of Medical Errors, in 
Marilynn M. Rosenthal and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, eds., Medical Error: What Do We 
Know? What Do We Do? 101, 107 (2002) (“hospitals and medical staffs have arguably 
paid more attention to impaired practitioners, where the legal risk is obvious, than to 
fixing systems errors that lack an easy villain.”)
321
 One cannot blame hospitals’ failure to reduce post-surgical infections on litigation’s 
tendency to drive error reports underground.  Hospitals know about the problem and the 
potential cures, but sometimes do nothing until they were sued.  Steven Lubet 
summarizes the failure of the Bridgeport Hospital in Connecticut to address obvious 
deficiencies in sanitary procedures, even as infection rates soared, until litigation brought 
the Hospital’s problems to light.  Post-litigation, the infection rate fell to “near zero.”  
Lubet, Like a Surgeon, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1178, 1194 (2003)  
Nor can litigation explain why providers often fail to use error reports that are 
generated internally to improve delivery systems.  See Institute for Safe Medication 
Practices, ISMP Survey Shows Weaknesses Persist in Hospital Systems for Error 
Detection, Reporting and Analysis, ISMP Medication Safety Alert! (Nov. 15, 2000) 
(“Although access to valuable error-related data may be easy to obtain, it may not 
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providers subject to liability for negligence behave in this fashion, it is 
absurd to think they would voluntarily spend hundreds of millions or 
billions of dollars implementing patient safety initiatives if the threat of 
liability were removed.  Optimism about providers’ likely responses to 
hortatory appeals to “do the right thing” should be distinguished from pie-
in-the-sky Pollyannaism.  
The conventional wisdom simply assumes this problem away.322  It 
is naïve to think that progress on the patient safety front would occur 
automatically if the threat of liability were removed.323  Providers are (all 
else being equal) more likely to attend to problems that are sources of 
liability than to problems for which the costs are externalized.324  Indeed, 
as Professor Bill Sage has noted, “innovation that improves safety often 
happens in the shadow of liability.”325
These observations do not mean that the arguments raised by 
patient safety advocates should be ignored.  Medical liability is an 
extraordinarily inefficient mechanism for encouraging the delivery of high 
quality care and for transferring resources from negligent providers to 
injured patients.  A strategy that uses the economic self-interest of 
providers to address the problems raised by patient safety advocates has 
more chance of succeeding than one that either relies on the legal system 
exclusively or eliminates tort regulation and puts nothing in its place.  
Useful approaches would harness all available forces—including 
market-based incentives, legal liability, and health care workers’ 
professionalism—to address these problems.  Firms in other industrial 
sectors have created non-punitive environments in which workers can 
actually [be] used to improve medication safety.  For example, more than a quarter of 
respondents (29%) said they had not collected and used information about pharmacy 
interventions to correct prescribing errors.”). 
322 Barry R. Furrow, The Problem of Medical Misadventures: A Review of E. Haavi 
Morreim’s Holding Health Care Accountable, 29 J. L. Med. & Ethics 381, 381 (2001) 
(“[M]uch of the current discussion among providers is self-protective, as it assumes that 
the threat of malpractice litigation is the problem, blocking discussion and disclosure of 
errors and thus preventing system improvements to decrease future errors.  Don’t spook 
physicians, say the critics, for they are easily spooked.  Protecting them from liability will 
open the floodgates of candid error disclosures, allowing for the necessary system 
improvements.”)
323
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report problems without fear of recrimination or reprisal, despite being 
subject to external liability threats (or even because of these threats).326
For these firms, the benefit of providing higher quality goods and services 
exceeds the associated cost, and non-punitive internal reporting systems 
provide the information needed to drive that outcome.  Health care 
organizations can create such environments if they are truly committed to 
providing high quality care.327
Patient safety advocates are also right in arguing that the health 
care sector needs a cultural transformation.  
Suppose that an airline’s managers and pilots repeatedly 
resisted installing collision-avoidance systems despite solid 
evidence of their worth.  Suppose, too, that they 
complained that the radar was not reimbursed adequately, 
required inconvenient retraining, provided no competitive 
advantage in attracting passengers at a time when airline 
profits were low, and (sotto voce) was an insult to pilot 
judgment.  No one would blithely blame “airline culture” 
for an ensuing disaster, and no one would absolve 
individual pilots and managers of responsibility for that 
disaster simply because they never intended for passengers 
to be harmed.328
Health care providers make arguments like these all the time, and they 
expect them to be taken seriously.  Better evidence of attitudes antithetical 
to patient safety would be hard to find.
Bad attitudes persist because providers have bad incentives.  A 
world in which health care providers profit by making mistakes is a world 
in which they will find reasons for allowing high error rates to persist.  No 
rational system of compensation rewards an agent for making a principal 
326
 See, e.g., Robert L. Helmreich, Managing Human Error in Aviation, Scientific 
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reporting policy “received more than 5,000 reports from its pilots in 21 months).
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worse off.329  Unless and until these incentive problems are corrected, 
patients will continue to receive low quality care, and medical errors will 
continue to beset our system of health care delivery.  
329
 Hyman & Silver, supra note   , at   .
